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Abstract
This dissertation consists of two essays. In the first essay, Enoch Hill and I develop
a dynamic general equilibrium model in which an increase in the importance of firm-
specific human capital is able to account for two key changes in business cycle patterns
in the U.S. since mid-1980s: jobless recoveries and the reversal in the cyclicality of labor
productivity. Additionally, we present empirical support that the importance of firm-
specific human capital has indeed increased in importance for recent recessions.
In the second essay, Zhifeng Cai and I develop a macroeconomic model of financial fric-
tions in order to account for the investment and cash holding behavior of self-financing
corporations during the Great Recession. Unlike standard models of financial frictions
which impose collateral or borrowing constraints on firms, the financial frictions in our
model work through the liquidity channel. In our model, corporate investment is sub-
ject to liquidity shocks. Bank credit line and liquid assets are substitutes for financing
liquidity shocks. In our model, a tightening of the bank credit line forces firms to hold
more liquid assets, increasing the effective cost of capital expenditure hence reducing
corporate investment.
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Chapter 1
Cautious Hiring
1.1 Introduction
It took nearly eight years following the 2008 recession for employment to reach its
prerecession level. This slow rate of recovery in employment is a phenomenon shared
by the two previous recessions (1990 and 2001). However, it contrasts sharply with
recessions prior to the mid-1980s, in which recoveries in employment are relatively fast.1
In fact, for recessions between World War II and the mid-1980s, employment recovered
to pre-recession levels in an average of just over two years and always within four.
This emergent pattern in employment is directly related to a conversation commonly
referred to by policymakers, journalists, as well as in the economic literature, as jobless
recovery.2 Jobless recoveries refer to the periods following recessions in which rebounds
in aggregate output are accompanied by much slower recoveries in employment.3
Closely related to jobless recovery is the cyclicality of average labor productivity.
When the recovery in employment lags the recovery in GDP, labor productivity rises.
In fact, during the three most recent recessions, average labor productivity has been
countercyclical, as opposed to being procyclical as in earlier recessions.4
1 See Gali et al. (2012).
2 Examples include Gordon (1993), Bernanke (2003), Gali et al. (2012), and Jaimovich and Siu
(2012).
3 This definition is taken from Jaimovich and Siu (2012). A reconciliation of this defintion with
Gali et al. (2012) is included in section 1.2.
4 This has previously been documented by McGrattan and Prescott (2012), Gali and van Rens
(2010), and Berger (2012), among others.
1
2We propose a novel mechanism that accounts for the slower rate of recovery in
employment and also reverses the cyclicality of labor productivity. Our mechanism
works through the increase in the importance of firm-specific human capital, namely,
the relative productivity of senior to junior workers. At a very abstract level before
providing a more detailed explanation, firm-specific human capital turns workers into a
type of investment. Productivity shocks make this investment risky. As the importance
of firm-specific human capital increases, the initial outlays of the investment become
greater and the potential benefits become greater as well making it more important to
avoid risk. One way to avoid that risk is to grow more slowly at the firm level (spreading
outlays over time) which in aggregate leads to a slower employment recovery.
Further, workers are initially unproductive in new jobs. If hiring following a reces-
sion is immediate, the fraction of workers in new positions will spike, lowering labor
productivity along with the decrease in output. If hiring is spread over a longer period,
this procyclical force is reduced. As average firms size following a recession is reduced,
decreasing returns to scale in labor provides an upward force on average labor pro-
ductivity. In recessions featuring fast employment recovery, the downward force from
the spike in new workers outweighs the upward force of smaller firm size. This can be
reversed for recessions with slower recoveries in employment.
Our economy features a simple model of firm growth in the spirit of Solow (1956).
However, in our model, growth occurs through the accumulation of human capital in
the form of senior workers, rather than the accumulation of physical capital.
There are a few key ingredients of our model. First, our model focuses on the portion
of skills that are firm-specific.5 Second, production is subject to idiosyncratic shocks
which generate a risk of bankruptcy. Third, the production technology exhibits de-
creasing returns to scale. We now provide a brief intuition of how our model ingredients
collectively account for the slower employment recovery and reversal in the cyclicality
of labor productivity.
Firm-specific human capital introduces a hold-up problem between firms and work-
ers. This hold-up problem compresses wages relative to differences in marginal produc-
tivity and converts the hiring decision into a form of investment. Specifically, newly
5 Mahone (2016) indicates that one-third to one-half of the training is not transferable across jobs.
Our model focuses on firm-specific skills and abstracts from general skills. General skills are fully
compensated in the wage and have no effect on hiring decisions.
3hired workers are overpaid and senior workers are underpaid relative to their contribu-
tion to output.
Intuitively, a newly hired worker gradually acquires firm-specific skills through learning-
by-doing and transitions into a senior worker. A senior worker is more productive but
has the same outside option as the newly hired worker. This is because with firm-specific
skills, separation of senior workers from their firm results in a loss of all firm specific
skills. If the worker were to separate they would have to start over as a new worker
at another firm. Due to this low outside option, wage bargaining implies that firms
are able to pay their senior workers a wage that is below marginal productivity. In
other words, firms are able to reap positive surplus off their senior workers. In anticipa-
tion that new workers will transition into senior workers where positive surplus can be
reaped, competition in the labor market will push the wage for new workers above their
marginal productivity. Therefore, firm-specific skills convert labor hiring into a form of
investment: a loss is incurred when a worker is newly hired in the form of overpayment,
and this initial loss is recovered when the worker acquires specific skills.
This investment perspective of hiring, combined with an idiosyncratic risk of bankruptcy,
leads to cautious hiring. A cost is incurred in the period junior workers are hired, and a
profit is made later when these junior workers become senior. Consequently, the stock
of senior workers is valuable to the firm. Hiring new workers lowers average profits of a
firm in the period of hiring and increases the risk of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is costly
to a firm since it causes a separation from their stock of senior workers. Firms trade
off a higher rate of growth with a higher risk of bankruptcy. As a result, firms hire
cautiously and grow slowly.
As firm-specific skills increase in importance, the productivity gap between senior
and junior workers widens, which leads to larger upfront costs as well as larger sub-
sequent returns. This raises the stakes of hiring and inherently makes it more risky
in nature. As a result, firms hire more cautious and grows more slowly. Following a
recession, a larger than normal fraction of firms exit which leads to a drop in aggregate
employment. Recovery is driven by new firms starting from size zero and gradually
growing to the mature size. Therefore, slower firm growth translates into a slower rate
of employment recovery.
The key parameter in our model is the relative productivity of senior to junior
4workers. As this ratio increases, firms are incurring more costs on each junior worker
and earning more profits off each senior worker. This makes hiring more risky: each
junior worker hired reduces the probability of firm survival, and the stock of senior
workers is more painful to lose if the firm fails to survive. Therefore, increasing the
relative productivity of senior to junior workers endogenously slows firm hiring. Our
model focuses on the recovery following a recession. In the context of our model, a
recession results in a larger than normal fraction of firms to exit. Recovery is driven
by new firms that start from size zero and grow to the mature size. Slower firm hiring
translates into a slower rate of employment recovery following a recession.
Next, we discuss how our mechanism is able to reverse the cyclicality of average
labor productivity. When the economy is recovering from a recession, there are two
opposing forces on labor productivity. The first is related to the composition of senior
to junior workers employed in the economy. Following an unexpected shock, a large
number of senior workers are separated from firms. Firms gradually hire back junior
workers. Therefore, in the ensuing recovery, the proportion of junior workers temporarily
increases. This exerts downward pressure on average labor productivity, since junior
workers are less productive than senior workers. The more quickly firms hire during
recovery, the stronger this composition force is.
The opposing force on labor productivity works through the decreasing returns to
scale production technology. A recession causes a fraction of firms to exit. These
firms start over from size zero, engage in cautious hiring, and are smaller in size than
an average firm in the stationary equilibrium. Due to the decreasing returns to scale
production technology, a smaller average firm size drives up average labor productivity.
When firm-specific human capital is less important, firms grow fast. This large influx
of newly hired workers strengthens the composition effect, resulting in a procyclical
pattern for average labor productivity. When firm-specific human capital becomes more
important, firms hire more slowly. Slower hiring spreads the influx of new workers across
time, and causes firms to spend a longer time operating with fewer workers. Therefore,
the composition effect is weakened and the decreasing return effect is strengthened. As
a result, a countercyclical pattern of average labor productivity emerges.
Of crucial importance to our model is the importance of firm-specific human capital,
and how it evolves over time. We estimate returns to tenure from the PSID, and use it
5to infer the importance of firm-specific human capital.6 We find that wage returns
to average tenure have increased from 4.84% for the period prior to 1982 to 13.02% for
the period after.
We calibrate a quantitative version of the model and show that the estimated increase
in the importance of firm-specific human capital can account for a quarter of the slower
employment recovery, and also reverses the cyclicality of labor productivity.
1.2 Related Literature
In this section, we briefly explain how our work ties into the existing empirical and
theoretical literature regarding slow labor recoveries and emergent acyclical labor pro-
ductivity patterns.
A number of papers including Gali et al. (2012), Gordon (1993), Groshen and Potter
(2003), and Bernanke (2003) have documented the slower rate of recovery in labor
through recent business cycles. Our model explains this change through an increase in
the importance of firm-specific human capital since the mid-1980s.
Our theoretical explanation for the slow labor recovery overlaps with several others
via the introduction of a mechanism which separates the marginal productivity of labor
from the wage. For example, Hall (2017) and Midrigan et al. (2014) emphasize the
role of discount rates. In their models, hiring a new worker incurs an upfront vacancy
posting cost which is earned back from future differences between productivity and
wage. If somehow the effective discount rate of firms falls (that is, future profits are
valued less today) during the recession (for example, due to a tightening of borrowing
constraints as in Midrigan et al. (2014)), hiring new workers becomes less profitable.
Similar to their models, our model also features an upfront cost of hiring new workers.
The difference is that in our model, this cost is due to the lower productivity of newly
hired workers relative to their wage. In addition, our mechanism for generating the
slower recoveries in recent recessions is an increase in the gap between the productivity
levels of new and existing workers, instead of a reduction in the effective discount rate.
An added benefit of our model is its ability to explain the emergent pattern in labor
6 We follow methods used by both Altonji and Williams (2005) and Topel (1991) to estimate the
returns to seniority over time.
6productivity over the business cycle.
Our mechanism does not fully account for the slower recovery in employment ob-
served in the data. Complementary explanations include worker reallocation (Groshen
and Potter (2003)), the greater use of just-in-time employment practices (Schreft et al.
(2005)), permanently destroyed employment at large firms (Luttmer (2012)), increased
access to credit card borrowing (Herkenhoff et al. (2016)), extension of countercyclical
unemployment benefits (Rabinovich and Mitman (2012)), rigid real wages due to ei-
ther lack of inflation or efficiency wages (Bils et al. (2016), Calvo et al. (2014), Shimer
(2012)), changes in female labor force participation and gender-biased technological
change (Sahin and Albanesi (2013)).
In addition to explaining the slow recovery, our work is related to the literature on
the cyclicality of average labor productivity. Prior to the mid-1980s, labor productivity
was procyclical. Explanations for this procyclical pattern include labor hoarding (for
example, Oi (1962) and Fay and Medoff (1985)) and procyclical technology shocks in
standard RBC models (for example, Kydland and Prescott (1982)).
Documentation and explanations for the new pattern in average labor productivity
starting from the mid-1980s include Mulligan (2011), McGrattan and Prescott (2014)
and McGrattan and Prescott (2014). To explain the new pattern in labor productivity,
McGrattan and Prescott (2014) incorporates intangible capital into a standard RBC
model, Arellano et al. (2016) shows that increased uncertainty at the firm level slows
down firm hiring without dragging down labor productivity, Gali and van Rens (2010)
demonstrates lower labor adjustment cost results in less labor hoarding hence less pro-
cyclical average labor productivity, and Barnichon (2010) attributes declined cyclicality
of labor productivity to declined aggregate demand shocks.7
7 As discussion of new patterns in labor productivity are core to our model, a brief aside to consider
the findings of Gali et al. (2012) is warranted. Gali et al. (2012) prefer to describe the emergent patterns
following recent recessions as slow recoveries rather than jobless recoveries since recoveries of GDP (and
several other series) have also slowed following recent recessions. We agree that this finding warrants
additional recognition in the literature by corroborating this finding in the data and replicating the
slower recovery in GDP through our model. However, we also argue that the relationship between
GDP and labor productivity has fundamentally shifted. Gali et al. (2012) rely on aggregate statistics
observed at four and eight quarters following each recession to establish changes in recovery patterns.
Our observations on average labor productivity make use of the time series as well as the correlation
statistic. Our findings reveal that the pattern in average labor productivity following a recession is not
monotonic which implies that discrete observations at various points could mask underlying changes.
Observations of the correlation between GDP and labor productivity, which can be observed in Figure
7Most related to our paper are those which attempt to provide explanations for both
the jobless recoveries and the change in the cyclicality of labor productivity. Sims and
Pries (2011) suggest that the nature of aggregate shocks has grown more asymmetric
across sectors. This leads to a reallocation of labor across sectors and a slow recovery.
Our mechanism can also be motivated through sectoral reallocation in that workers
reallocate from routine sectors into non-routine sectors. Our paper is also related to
Berger (2012) which attributes changes in average labor productivity to firm restruc-
turing and the removal of less productive employees during recoveries. In both papers,
hiring workers is initially costly but profitable later on. In Berger (2012), only certain
new employees are good matches. As a result, hiring new employees is costly and the
existing stock of workers is valuable. In our model, senior employees have acquired firm-
specific skills which are not fully compensated in the wage. These workers represent a
real value to the firm.
Our mechanism relies on the consideration of a firm’s hiring decision as a form
of investment. In this sense, our paper builds on the seminal work of Becker (1964).
In this work, the costs and returns of firm-specific training are largely attributed to
firms and there is a difference between the marginal product of labor and the wage.
Additional empirical work on this topic includes Frazis and Loewenstein (2006), and
Isen (2012). Our mechanism is also at work in Hudomiet (2015), where adaptation
costs are incurred due to the lower productivity of newly hired workers. This leads
to fewer jobs and a longer unemployment duration. However, our application differs
from the work of Hudomiet (2015) in its exploration of how differences in adaptation
costs across various occupations generate higher unemployment rates for less educated
workers.
Firm-specific human capital is of critical importance to our mechanism. We use
the returns to seniority as a proxy for firm-specific skills and estimate it following the
methodology of Altonji and Shakotko (1987), Altonji and Williams (2005), and Topel
(1991). This is related to a large literature estimating the returns to seniority, including
Buchinsky et al. (2010), Abraham and Farber (1987), Dustmann and Meghir (2005),
and Neal (1995).
1.2, provide additional support that the relationship between GDP and average labor productivity has
changed.
8The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.3, we document two
main patterns which have changed over more recent recessions. Section 1.4 presents the
dynamic model and defines the stationary equilibrium. In Section 1.5, we present our
stationary equilibrium results. Section 1.6 calibrates our parameters to the data. In
Section 1.7, we present the business cycle properties of our model and compare them to
the data. Section 1.8 concludes.
1.3 Data
Employment recoveries following the mid-1980s have been significantly slower than those
prior. Not only have employment recoveries become slower, they have also become
slower relative to the corresponding recoveries in GDP. This can be observed through
the cyclicality of average labor productivity. In this section, we formally present these
emergent patterns with a particular focus on business cycles.
1.3.1 Employment Recovery
Employment is measured as total hours worked in the non-farm business sector using
data from the BLS. To visually observe the slower recovery in employment, a comparison
plot is provided in Figure 1.1. To assist in comparison, employment is normalized to
zero at the pre-recession peak. Employment drops during each recession and gradually
recovers afterwards. The blue solid line is the average path of employment for the three
most recent recessions. The red dashed line is the average path for the three recessions
immediately preceding the mid-1980s. This comparison highlights the slower recovery
of the three more recent recessions.
To formally calculate the speed of employment recovery for different recessions, we
compute the number of years it takes for employment to return to its pre-recession peak.
To standardize comparison across business cycles, we measure the speed of employment
recovery as the length of time between the NBER end date and the date at which
employment returns to its pre-recession peak. Measuring recovery from the NBER end
date avoids conflating the length of recession with the length of recovery. The result is
displayed in Table 1.1.
For the recessions prior to the mid-1980s (1953, 1957, 1960, 1969, 1973 and 1981
9Table 1.1: Employment Recovery Comparison
Fast Recovery Recessions
Recession Starting Year 1953 1957 1960 1969 1973 1981 Average
Recovery Length 2 1 1.25 2.75 4 1.25 2.04
Slow Recovery Recessions
Recession Starting Year 1990 2001 2007
Recovery Length > 6 6.5 > 6
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, NBER recession dates, and Author’s calculations
recessions8 ), employment fully recovers to pre-recession levels within four years. The
average recovery length is 2.04 years. In contrast, even six years after each of the
three most recent recessions (1990, 2001 and 2008 recessions), employment remains
significantly below the pre-recession level.
Additional comparison in the speed of recovery in employment is included in Ap-
pendix A.1.
1.3.2 Average Labor Productivity
Not only have employment recoveries become slower for recent recessions, they have also
become slower relative to the corresponding recoveries in output.9 We define average
labor productivity to be real output over total hours worked. If GDP recovers more
slowly than employment following a recession, average labor productivity will stay below
its stationary equilibrium level along the recovery path. Consequently, average labor
productivity will be pro-cyclical. Alternatively, if GDP recovers faster than employment,
average labor productivity will stay above its stationary equilibrium level along the
recovery path and display a counter-cyclical pattern.
Figure 1.2 displays the 10-year centered moving-average correlation between labor
productivity and GDP. Each point in the series is calculated as the correlation between
GDP and average labor productivity for a window of 10 years centered at the displayed
date. Prior to the mid-1980s, labor productivity was procyclical. However, following
8 The recovery following the 1980 recession is interrupted by the 1981 recession, resulting in an
incomplete recovery path.
9 This fact has been previously documented. See Gali and van Rens (2010), Barnichon (2010),
Berger (2012), and McGrattan and Prescott (2012) for examples.
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the mid-1980s, labor productivity has been acyclical or even slightly counter cyclical.
To focus on the correlation between average labor productivity and GDP over the
business cycle, we plot the comovement of the two data series from each of the six
most recent recessions. In the three recessions immediately prior to the mid-1980s
(which we will label the “Fast Recovery” recessions), average labor productivity tracks
GDP closely: dropping at or just before the onset of the recession and recovering fairly
quickly following the recession. However, in the three most recent recessions (the “Slow
Recovery” recessions), the comovement between average labor productivity and GDP
becomes weaker. Average labor productivity remains fairly flat leading into the reces-
sion, increases rapidly beginning mid-recession, and falls a few years after the recession.
These features can be observed in Figures 1.3 and 1.4.
1.4 Environment
Our economy features a simple model of firm growth. Unlike standard models where
the growth of firms occurs through the accumulation of physical capital, in our model,
growth occurs through the accumulation of human capital in the form of senior workers.
Time is discrete. There are three types of agents: a continuum of representative
households, a continuum of heterogeneous firms, and financial intermediaries. The
problems of households and financial intermediaries are simple. The primary focus is
on firms.
1.4.1 Households
There is a unit measure of representative households. Households supply labor to firms
and consume wage and dividend income. Formally, the household’s problem is given by
max
{ct,Lt}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (Ct, Lt)
s.t. Ct ≤ wtLt +Dt, for all t
where wt is the average wage income of the household and Dt is the dividends paid out
by firms. The workforce is comprised of senior and junior workers who receive different
wage rates. For simplicity, we assume that households are organized into families.
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Each family has a representative share of senior and junior workers. Consequently,
wt = w
J
t s
J
t + w
S
t s
S
t , where w
J
t and w
S
t represent the wage rates of junior and senior
workers. sJt and s
S
t represent the share of junior and senior workers employed in the
economy. Similarly, each family also owns a representative share of the firms. This
family structure removes idiosyncratic risk at the household level and allows us to focus
on firms. (This risk-sharing arrangement is similar to Merz (1995), Andolfatto (1996),
and Midrigan et al. (2014).)
In equilibrium, the resource constraint implies that consumption for each household
is equal to the total output of the economy: Ct = Yt.
1.4.2 Firms
There is a unit measure of firms owned by the households. They produce output ac-
cording to the production function y = znα. z is an idiosyncratic productivity shock
that is i.i.d across firms with distribution function F (z). n is the total effective units
of labor hired by the firm.
At each firm, workers differ in terms of their firm-specific skills. During the initial
period of employment at a firm, workers are junior without any firm-specific skills.
Junior workers convert 1 unit of time into θJ units of effective labor. At the end of
each period of employment, junior workers acquire firm-specific skills and transition
into senior with probability ζ. Senior workers convert 1 unit of time into θS units of
effective labor. Senior workers stay senior unless they are separated from the firm. In
the case of separation, senior workers lose all firm-specific skills and start over as a
junior worker in the labor market. Since skills are firm-specific, firms are unable to
directly hire senior workers. Instead, in order to acquire a senior worker, they must
hire a junior worker who becomes senior in subsequent periods. A firm with nS existing
senior workers which decides to hire nJ junior workers has total effective labor units
given by n = θJnJ + θSnS .10
10 Our model abstracts from general forms of human capital which can be transferred across firms.
We assume that any forms of human capital which modify a worker’s outside option are fully reflected
in their wage.
One way our model implicitly includes general forms of human capital (albeit in a relatively rigid
framework) is by assuming that a worker with h units of general human capital provides h units of
effective labor of the category of their firm specific human capital. Firms choose how many units of
effective junior labor to hire and pay wJ for each unit. A junior worker with h units of general human
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In the spirit of Calvo (1983), modeling the transition from junior to senior worker as a
probabilistic process significantly simplifies the state space. In reality, workers gradually
accumulate firm-specific skills over time. However, modeling in this way would require
the model to keep track of the quantity of workers at each tenure for each firm. At the
firm level, gradual accumulation of firm-specific skills and probabilistic transition are
equivalent. In Section 1.6.3, we document that a probabilistic transition from junior
to senior worker does a reasonable job of approximating the wage profile across worker
tenure.
In our model, junior workers hired in the past who have not become senior are
identical to a new hire who has never worked for the firm. Consequently, firm’s decisions
are independent of the number of junior workers employed in prior periods and the state
space reduces to the number of senior workers for each firm.
Timing
Firms enter each period with nS senior workers and decide how many junior workers nJ
to hire. Working capital is required to cover the cash flow mismatch between wage pay-
ment of
(
wSnS + wJnJ
)
at the beginning of the period and the realization of revenues.
This working capital is financed by taking out an intra-period loan from the financial
intermediaries. The intra-period loan is repaid at the end of the period.
Next, productivity shock z is realized, production occurs, and revenue is generated
according to z. If revenue is sufficient to pay back the financial intermediaries, firms
pay back their debt, distribute the remaining profits as dividends to the households,
and continue into the next period with nS
′ ≡ (1− δ) (nS + ζnJ) senior workers, where
δ is the exogenous separation rate between firms and workers. If revenue is insufficient
to pay back financial intermediaries, firms exit. Upon exiting, all revenue from the
current period is confiscated by the financial intermediaries, and in the subsequent
period, the owner starts a new firm with zero senior workers. In addition to exit caused
by bankruptcy, firms also exit exogenously with some probability ξ each period.11 A
capital receives hwJ in wages and provides hθJ effective units of labor to the firm. When that worker
turns senior, they receive a wage of hwS and provide hθS units of effective labor to the firm. Finally,
we normalize the average general human capital per household to 1 so that the total supply of labor
remains unchanged. In this manner, our model implicitly can account for general forms of human capital
without any additional modification.
11 With a decreasing returns to scale production technology, the value of a firm without any senior
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visual depiction of the timing is displayed in Figure 1.5.12
The price of the final output is normalized to 1 and wage rates are measured in units
of real output.
A firm’s hiring decision is most easily explained in the reverse order. For a firm
with nS senior workers, in order to determine how number junior workers nJ to hire, it
needs to form expectations about the schedules of wage rates wS
(
nS , nJ
)
, wJ
(
nS , nJ
)
,
interest rate R
(
nS , nJ
)
, and the cutoff productivity level z∗
(
nS , nJ
)
for bankruptcy. We
will start with the determination of these schedules, then return to the hiring decision
of firms.
Wage Bargaining
Consider a firm with nS senior workers which has chosen to hire nJ junior workers.
To demonstrate wage bargaining, it is helpful to define the value functions at different
points in time throughout a period. In particular, we denote the value functions at
the beginning of the period before any hiring decisions are made by, V 1, S1, and J1
representing the value to a firm, senior worker, and junior worker, respectively. We
denote the value functions after wage bargaining and the determination of interest rate
and bankruptcy cutoff by, V 2, S2, and J2.13 Figure 1.6 illustrates the timing for the
workers is strictly positive, capturing the economic rent derived from the fixed factor. Implicit in our
model is the assumption that financial intermediaries are unable to seize and liquidate this fixed factor.
One interpretation for this fixed factor is the managerial human capital provided by the owner of the
firm. Upon default, lenders are unable to confiscate the value provided by this human capital and
consequently firms are unable to borrow against it or use it pay their liabilities.
12 We assume that at the end of each period, firms pay out all profits (if any) as dividends. That
is to say, firms are restricted from retaining earnings. There exists a large literature in finance which
argues that there are substantial costs of maintaining a large buffer stock of retained earnings. For
example, Jensen (1986) argued that, in practice, if firms retain a large amount of their earnings in
order to build up a buffer, managers use these funds in ways that benefit their private interests rather
than shareholder interests. Since shareholders understand this, they give managers incentives to pay
out funds immediately rather than retain them. We crudely model this effect by preventing firms
from retaining any earnings in the form of cash. However, firms do save in a sense by investing in
junior workers at a loss which is earned back when the workers become senior. In addition to higher
productivity, senior workers also serve as protection against default in the case of a poor realization
of z. Mature firms default significantly less than their younger counterparts. For brand new start-up
firms, this assumption on retained earnings makes no difference in the first period. But it slows down
firm hiring in subsequent periods. Allowing retention of earnings in a liquid form weakens our result
quantitatively but not qualitatively.
13 Note that V 2 reduces to V 1 when it is evaluated at the equilibrium policy function and wage
schedules. The same applies for S2 and J2.
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various value functions.
Suppose the wage rates for senior and junior workers have been determined to be
wS and wJ , and the interest rate and bankruptcy cutoff have been determined to be R
and z∗. Define the state variables at this point in time by s ≡ (nS , nJ , wS , wJ , R, z∗).
Then the value functions to the firm, its senior workers, and its junior workers are:
V 2 (s) =
∫
z∗
[
z
(
θSnS + θJnJ
)α − (wSnS + wJnJ)R+ β (1− ξ)V 1 (nS′)] f (z) dz
+β [1− (1− F (z∗)) (1− ξ)]V 1 (0)
S2 (s) = wS + β (1− δ) (1− F (z∗)) (1− ξ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
No Separation from the Firm
S1
(
nS
′)
+β [1− (1− δ) (1− F (z∗)) (1− ξ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Separation from the Firm
J1
J2 (s) = wJ + β (1− δ) (1− F (z∗)) (1− ξ) ζ︸ ︷︷ ︸
No Separation and Transition into Senior
S1
(
nS
′)
+β [1− (1− δ) (1− F (z∗)) (1− ξ) ζ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Separation or Not Transition into Senior
J1
where nS
′ ≡ (1− δ) (nS + ζnJ) is the number of senior workers at the firm tomorrow
conditional on survival.
The value to the firm consists of current period profits, as well as a continuation
value depending on survival. If the productivity shock z is above the default cutoff z∗
and exogenous firm exit does not occur, firms survive into the subsequent period with
nS
′ ≡ (nS + ζnJ) senior workers. Otherwise, firms exit and the owners start new firms
in the following period with no senior workers.
The value J2 (s) to a junior worker consists of the current period wage they receive
wJ plus a continuation value. If the firm survives and there is no exogenous separation
of the worker from the firm, then the junior worker transitions into a senior worker with
probability ζ in the subsequent period. Otherwise, they stay junior.
The value S2 (s) to a senior worker is similar. The only difference is that senior work-
ers stay senior with probability one, unless either the firm exits or exogenous separation
occurs.
With these value functions defined, we can now analyze wage determination.
There is a competitive labor market for junior workers. The wage rate for junior
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workers needs to satisfy the market clearing condition:
J2
(
nS , nJ , wS
(
nS , nJ
)
, wJ
(
nS , nJ
)
, R
(
nS , nJ
)
, z∗
(
nS , nJ
))
= J1. (1.1)
Intuitively, junior workers have the freedom of choosing which firm to work for.
Therefore, firms of all sizes need to offer a common market value J1 to make junior
workers indifferent about which firm to join. Note that Equation (1.1) does not simply
imply an equalization of junior wage across all firm sizes. This is because firms of
different sizes have different probabilities of survival. Firm exit leads to the separation of
workers from firms. In this case, junior workers lose the opportunity of becoming senior
and must start over as junior at another firm. Therefore, firms with higher probability
of default need to offer a higher junior wage wJ to compensate junior workers for the
risk.
The wage rates for senior workers are determined through bargaining. Due to firm-
specific skills, there exists joint surplus when a senior worker stays with their firm. If
this match is destroyed, both the firm and the senior worker become worse off: the firm
has to replace the senior worker with unskilled junior workers; and the senior worker
has to start over at another firm as a junior worker. We assume that the match surplus
between a firm and its senior workers is shared via bargaining. In particular, the surplus
to a senior worker of staying with their firm is S2 (s)− J2 (s). The surplus to a firm of
being matched with the marginal senior worker is dV
2
dnS
.14 We assume that a fraction
φ of the joint surplus is obtained by senior workers: S
2
(
nS , nJ , wS
(
nS , nJ
)
, wJ
(
nS , nJ
)
, R
(
nS , nJ
)
, z∗
(
nS , nJ
))
−J2 (nS , nJ , wS (nS , nJ) , wJ (nS , nJ) , R (nS , nJ) , z∗ (nS , nJ))

dV 2
(
nS , nJ , wS
(
nS , nJ
)
, wJ
(
nS , nJ
)
, R
(
nS , nJ
)
, z∗
(
nS , nJ
))
dnS
=
φ
1− φ. (1.2)
14 Implicitly assumed about our bargaining protocol is that when a marginal senior worker threatens
to quit a firm, the firm will “re-bargain” with all its remaining senior workers, junior workers (here, we
think of the competitive determination of junior wage an extreme case of wage bargaining), as well as
the financial intermediaries to re-determine the wage and interest rates. This re-bargaining process is
captured by the second, third, fourth, and fifth terms in the following expansion of the total derivative:
dV 2
(
nS , nJ , wS
(
nS , nJ
)
, wJ
(
nS , nJ
)
, R
(
nS , nJ
)
, z∗
(
nS , nJ
))
dnS
=
∂V 2
∂nS
+
∂V 2
∂wS
∂wS
∂nS
+
∂V 2
∂wJ
∂wJ
∂nS
+
∂V 2
∂R
∂R
∂nS
+
∂V 2
∂z∗
∂z∗
∂nS
.
Our model is robust to other bargaining protocols.
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Wage bargaining of senior and junior workers is assumed to happen simultaneously.
Instead of treating senior and junior workers separately, we lump the two groups to-
gether into a single group of workers. We think of the competitive wage determination
of junior workers as a special and extreme form of bargaining, where each junior worker
automatically obtain the market value for junior workers J1. With this generalized def-
inition of bargaining, the simultaneous wage determination of senior and junior workers
here is equivalent to firms bargaining with its workers on a one-by-one basis.
Our model also features a multi-party bargaining with decreasing returns. Many
potential bargaining protocols are possible: all senior workers can form a union and
bargain with firms as a whole, or senior workers can bargain with firms as small groups.
Here we adopt the bargaining solution of Stole and Zwiebel (1996), in which firms
negotiate with each of their senior workers in turn. This bargaining protocol was first
used by Cahuc and Wasmer (2001), and later on by Hawkins and Acemoglu (2014) and
Elsby and Michaels (2013) among others.
Financial Intermediaries
Competitive financial intermediaries make intra-period loans to firms. Since productiv-
ity shocks are idiosyncratic across firms, financial intermediaries are not subject to any
aggregate uncertainty and behave as risk-neutral lenders. They offer an interest rate
schedule R based on the number of senior workers nS at a firm as well as the number
of junior workers nJ hired by the firm. Interest rate schedule R and cutoff productivity
level z∗ for default are jointly determined by:
z∗
(
nS , nJ
) [
θSnS + θJnJ
]α
=
(
wS
(
nS , nJ
)
nS + wJ
(
nS , nJ
)
nJ
)
R
(
nS , nJ
)
(1.3)
wS
(
nS , nJ
)
nS + wJ
(
nS , nJ
)
nJ =
∫ z∗(nS ,nJ)
z
[
θSnS + θJnJ
]α
f(z)dz (1.4)
+
∫
z∗(nS ,nJ )
(
wS
(
nS , nJ
)
nS + wJ
(
nS , nJ
)
nJ
)
R
(
nS , nJ
)
f(z)dz
where Equation (1.3) defines the cutoff level in productivity draws z∗ below which firms
are unable to repay the loan and Equation (1.4) is the break-even condition for risk-
neutral financial intermediaries. Intuitively, firms with a higher risk of default need
to pay a higher interest rate on their working-capital loan to compensate financial
intermediaries for the lower probability of getting paid back.
17
Implicitly assumed here is a lack of insurance for firms. Financial intermediaries are
not allowed to sign long term contracts with firms to insure against their idiosyncratic
productivity risk. This lack of insurance can arise when there is asymmetric information
between firms and financial intermediaries. For example, if the productivity shocks are
unobservable by financial intermediaries so that no contracts can be contingent upon
the shock realizations. Here this lack of commitment is assumed for simplicity. This is
more natural for small firms which have not built up a high credit score, or established
any reputation or relationship with banks.
Equations (1.1), (1.2), (1.3), and (1.4) provide us with four equations and four
unknowns: wS
(
nS , nJ
)
, wJ
(
nS , nJ
)
, R
(
nS , nJ
)
, and z∗
(
nS , nJ
)
. With these four
schedules determined, we can proceed to the hiring decision of firms.
Firm Hiring Decision
Firms solve the following Bellman equation:
V 1(nS) = maxnJ V
2
(
nS , nJ , wS
(
nS , nJ
)
, wJ
(
nS , nJ
)
, R
(
nS , nJ
)
, z∗
(
nS , nJ
))
(1.5)
Lemma 1 Combining the Bellman’s equation of firms with the break-even condition of
financial intermediaries, we can simplify Bellman Equation (1.5) to:
V 1(nS) = max
nJ
E [z]
[
θSnS + θJnJ
]α − (wS (nS , nJ)nS + wJ (nS , nJ)nJ)
+β
[
1− (1− F (z∗ (nS , nJ))) (1− ξ)]V 1(0)
+β
(
1− F (z∗ (nS , nJ))) (1− ξ)V 1 (nS′)
Intuitively, since financial intermediaries are risk-neutral and breaking even, it is as if
firms are maximizing expected profits for the current period. The effects of default only
enter through the continuation value of firms. The proof of this lemma are relegated to
Appendix A.3.
Wage bargaining compresses wages relative to the marginal productivity of labor.
The following lemma provides an intuitive characterization of the wage bargaining pro-
tocol between senior workers and firms:
Lemma 2 Assuming there is no risk of default or exogenous separation ξ = 0, constant
returns to scale α = 1, and one-period transition from junior to senior worker ζ = 1,
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wage bargaining Equation (1.2) implies:[
wS − wJ] = φ [E (z) θS − E (z) θJ] . (1.6)
The proof of this lemma is in Appendix A.4. Intuitively, the wage difference between
senior and junior workers is compressed relative to the difference in their productivities.
The compression factor is equal to the bargaining power of senior workers φ. Firm-
specific skills introduce a hold-up problem between senior workers and firms. When a
worker transitions from junior into senior, their productivity increases from θJ to θS .
However, due to the hold-up problem, the worker is only able to bargain a fraction φ
of their gain in productivity into an increase in their wage. The weaker the bargaining
power φ of the worker, the less the gain in wage from junior to senior worker. In an
extreme case where workers have no bargaining power φ = 0, firms are essentially making
take-it-or-leave-it offers to senior workers. In this case, senior workers get paid their
outside option, which is the junior wage. This wage compression is visually displayed
in Figure 1.7.
There are two implications from wage bargaining Equation 1.6. First, the wage
of senior workers relative to junior workers can be used to back out the differences in
productivity levels across workers. Second, senior workers are more valuable to a firm
relative to junior workers due to wage compression. In equilibrium, competition in the
market for junior workers ensures that firms break even over the lifetime of a worker.
Hiring a junior worker is a costly investment which pays off when the worker becomes
senior. In this sense, senior workers represent a real value to the firm. Should the firm
fail to survive, the loss of senior workers represents a real cost. For this reason, firms
are cautious in their hiring in order to balance growth against the risk of losing their
stock of senior workers.
This simple wage Equation (1.6) no longer holds when there is risk of default or
decreasing returns to scale. With risk of default, senior workers provide an additional
benefit to the firm, which is to mitigate the risk of default. This strengthens the bargain-
ing position of senior workers. With a decreasing returns to scale production function,
the marginal productivities of senior and junior workers are no longer θS and θJ . In-
stead, they depend on the size of the firm.
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1.4.3 Recursive Stationary Equilibrium
An abbreviated defintion of the recursive stationary equilibrium is provided here. A
more detailed version is provided in Appendix (A.5).
Definition 1 A recursive stationary equilibrium consists of: value functions for firms,
senior workers, and junior workers; a policy function for firm’s hiring decision; sched-
ules of senior wage, junior wage, interest rate, and bankruptcy cutoff; and a distribution
of firm sizes, aggregate output, and labor such that:
1. Give wage and interest rate schedules, the value function of firms solves the firm’s
Bellman equation
2. Schedules for wage rates, interest rate, and bankruptcy cutoff are jointly deter-
mined through wage bargaining and intermediary break-even equations: (1.1),
(1.2), (1.3), and (1.4)
3. The labor market clears
4. The distribution of firms is consistent with the policy function
1.5 Stationary Equilibrium
In this section, some intuition is provided about our cautious hiring mechanism. In
particular, we demonstrate how the productivity gap θS/θJ between senior and junior
workers affects firm growth and the speed of employment recovery following a recession.
The cautious hiring behavior of firms comes from the combination of firm-specific
skills and the lack of commitment by firms. Firm-specific skills give firms ex-post
monopoly power and leads to a compressed wage profile relative to productivity pro-
file. Junior workers are overpaid relative to their productivity and senior workers are
underpaid. Hiring junior workers is risky because junior workers lower the expected
current period profit and increase the probability of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy leads to
the separation of firms from their stock of senior workers. Since these workers provide
positive surplus, bankruptcy is costly.
Firms enter each period with a stock of senior workers who produce a positive ex-
pected cash flow. This positive cash flow is used to compensate for the expected losses
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of hiring junior workers. Junior workers that are retained have some probability of be-
coming senior in the subsequent period. The risky nature of hiring junior workers makes
firms cautious about hiring too quickly. As firms gradually accumulate senior workers,
they will eventually reach a mature size due to the decreasing returns to scale technol-
ogy. At this point, firms hire just enough junior workers each period to compensate for
the exogenous separation of senior workers.
Next we analyze how a change in θS/θJ affects the rate of growth for firms. Equilib-
rium hiring decisions are chiefly dependent on the ratio of θS/θJ rather than the level
of each.15 To simplify the intuition in this section, we fix θJ at 1 and only analyze
changes in θS .
Consider a comparative statics exercise. We simulate three economies, one without
firm-specific human capital
(
θS = θJ = 1
)
, one with a lower importance of firm-specific
human capital, θSlow, and one with a higher importance of firm-specific human capital,
θShigh. Specifically 1 < θ
S
low < θ
S
high. We plot and compare the growth paths of the three
economies in their respective stationary equilibria.
Figure 1.8 is a plot of the growth path for a typical firm in each of the three
economies. The horizontal axis measures the number of senior workers nS a firm enters
the period with. The vertical axis measures the number of senior workers the firm will
have at the beginning of the subsequent period (specifically, it is equal to the number
of senior workers, nS , plus the number of junior workers hired, nJ , after accounting for
those workers exogenously separated from the firm, (1− δ) (nS + ζnJ)). In the case
where senior and junior workers are equally productive (left panel, θS = θJ = 1), the
optimal size of a firm is reached in one period no matter how many senior workers the
firm starts with. This is because junior workers are as productive as senior workers
so they no longer incur an initial investment upon hiring (nor do senior worker offer
a positive expected return in this setting). In this case, the hiring decision becomes a
static problem. Firms always hire the optimal number of workers in each period. When
we introduce a difference in the productivity levels between senior and junior workers
(middle panel, θSlow), the optimal size of a firm is gradually reached as the firm balances
growth against risk of bankruptcy. A further increase in the productivity gap between
15 Suppose θS and θJ are both scaled by λ. The equilibrium wage rates will rise by λα. None of the
firms’ hiring decisions will be affected.
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θJ and θS (right panel, θShigh) causes start-up firms to take even smaller steps in terms
of hiring. As a result, it takes more steps (a longer time) for firms to reach the optimal
size.
To understand how exactly an increase in θS/θJ leads to slower growth of firms,
we decompose the change in firm’s growth path into a partial equilibrium effect and a
general equilibrium effect. Following an increase in θS , and holding wage rates fixed,
firms are reaping more surplus off each senior worker they employ. As a result, firms
increase their hiring of junior workers who will become senior workers later on. This
partial equilibrium effect tends to speed up firm growth.16 At the same time, an
increase in the demand for junior workers drives up wage rates. This general equilibrium
effect tends to discourage firm hiring and slows down firm growth.
To separate these two effects, we conduct a counterfactual experiment. As we transit
from one stationary equilibrium with θSlow to another with θ
S
high, we decompose the
change in the policy functions into partial and general equilibrium effects. In Figure
1.9, we plot the respective policy functions. The blue curve is the policy function for
the stationary equilibrium with θSlow, and the red curve is the policy function for the
stationary equilibrium with θShigh. The pink curve is a counterfactual policy function
for an economy with θShigh but with wage and interest rates for both senior and junior
workers fixed at the levels in the equilibrium with θSlow.
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The partial equilibrium effect is represented by the shift from the blue curve to the
pink curve. Following an increase in θS (holding wage and interest rates fixed), senior
workers become more valuable to firms. As a result, firms increase their hiring of junior
workers due to an increase in the future value of a worker. This partial equilibrium
effect is heterogeneous across firms. Specifically it is weaker (or even negative) for small
firms relative to large firms. As θS increases, the positive cash flow each senior worker
brings to the firm increases. This lowers the probability of default. Compared with
large firms, small firms have fewer senior workers. Consequently, the default probability
for small firms does not decline as much. As a result, small firms do not increase their
hiring of junior workers as much as large firms.
16 Note that there are multiple distinct forces which together comprise the complete partial equilib-
rium effect. This is explored further below.
17 Since wages aren’t permitted to adjust in this counterfactual experiment, the labor market does
not clear for the green line.
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To illustrate the heterogeneity of the partial equilibrium effect, Figure 1.10 plots
the default probabilities as a function of the number of junior workers hired. The left,
middle, and right panels correspond to firms of sizes 0, 5, and 15 respectively (i.e.,
having 0, 5, and 15 senior workers). The solid blue curves plot the default probabilities
in an economy with θS = θSlow. The circles on each solid curve indicate the optimal
hiring choices in the θSlow economy. Regardless of firm size, the more junior workers a
firm hires, the higher the probability of default. Next, we increase the productivity level
of senior workers from θSlow to θ
S
high while holding wage rates fixed at the equilibrium
levels of θSlow. Following this increase, default probability curves shift down from the
solid blue curves to the dashed red curves. There are significant reductions in the default
probability for firms of sizes 5 and 15. Intuitively, an increase in the productivity of
senior workers mitigates the default risk and makes junior workers less risky to hire.
This allows firms of sizes 5 and 15 to hire junior workers more quickly while maintaining
a similar level of default risk.18 On the other hand, for firms of size 0, the default
probability curve under θS = θShigh coincides with the case θ
S = θSlow. Since these
firms have no senior workers, there is no effect on their default probabilities when θS
increases. Consequently, these start-up firms do not significantly alter their hiring of
junior workers.19
18 This can be seen in the middle and right panels. The optimal hiring under θShigh is higher than
that under θSlow (squares are to the right of the circles), while the default probabilities do not increase
much (squares and circles are roughly of equal heights).
19 In fact, firms of size 0 reduce the hiring of junior workers. The Bellman equation for a firm of size
0 is:
V 1 (0) = max
nJ
E (z)
[
θJnJ
]α
− wJnJ + βV 1
(
(1− δ) ζnJ
)
−β
[
1−
(
1− F
(
z∗
(
0, nJ
))
(1− ξ)
)] [
V 1
(
(1− δ) ζnJ
)
− V 1 (0)
]
As θS increases, the value function shifts upwards and becomes steeper. This has two opposing forces
on the hiring decision. On the one hand, increased continuation value V 1
(
(1− δ) ζnJ) encourages firms
to hire more junior workers who will become senior workers in the following period, given that firms
survive. On the other hand, increased continuation value V
(
(1− δ) ζnJ) makes firm exit more painful
(this is represented by a higher difference
[
V 1
(
(1− δ) ζnJ)− V 1 (0)]). Since hiring junior workers
increases the probability of exit F
(
z∗
(
0, nJ
))
, this second force discourages firms from hiring junior
workers.
For firms with a positive stock of senior workers, the Bellman equation is:
V 1
(
nS
)
= max
nJ
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[
θSnS + θJnJ
]α
−
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wSnS + wJnJ
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}
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The general equilibrium effect is represented in Figure 1.9 by the change from the
pink curve to the red curve. An increase in the wage rates is needed to clear the labor
market as we move from the θSlow economy to the θ
S
high economy. This wage increase
discourages firms from hiring junior workers. As a result, the red curve lies below the
pink one. This general equilibrium effect reduces the hiring of firms across all sizes.
Combining the partial and general equilibrium effects (from the blue curve to the
red curve), smaller firms with size close to zero reduce their hiring, while larger firms
increase their hiring. As θS increases, a start-up firm of size zero will grow slowly
initially, followed by more rapid growth later on. If we measure firm sizes as a fraction
of the size of a mature firm, then growth slows down across all firm sizes.
Following a recession, a larger than normal fraction of firms goes bankruptcy which
leads to a drop in aggregate employment. The recovery phase is mainly driven by
owners of new firms starting from size zero and growing their firms to the mature size.
A higher level of θS/θJ slows down the growth rate of start-up firms and leads to a
slower recovery in employment.20
1.6 Quantitative Analysis
Of crucial importance to our model is the contribution of firm-specific human capital
to the productivity of labor. In this section, we provide an estimate of this parameter
and analyze how it evolves over time.
In practice, disentangling the marginal contribution of a specific worker is quite diffi-
cult as production from most firms involves the coordinated effort of multiple individuals
The two forces above are still present. However, the second force (survival concern) is mitigated by an
increase in θS for large firms (F
(
z∗
(
nS , nJ
))
shifts down as θS increases). Therefore, the first force
dominates and it encourages firms to hire more junior workers.
20 Recent work in related literature corroborates the idea that business cycle job growth is largely
driven by young firms. Fort et al. (2013) seeks to reconcile apparent discrepancy between Moscarini
and Postel-Vinay (2012) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) regarding whether large or small firms drive
movements in employment throughout the business cycle. They find that firm age is the missing link
to understanding differences across these papers and that it is young rather than mature firms that are
primarily responsible for fluctuations over the business cycle both in downturns and upturns. Decker
et al. (2014) provides additional support that it is young firms primarily responsible for job creation
stating, “business startups account for 20% of US gross job creation while high-growth business (which
are disproportionately young) account for 50% of gross job creation.” Using data from the BDS, we
compute that roughly four-fifths (79.8%) of net job creation in the years following the 2008 recession
(2011 to 2014) was attributable to firms of age five or less.
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completing various tasks both separately and in groups. Further, hiring decisions by
firms are endogenous with output.21
Although output of individual workers is difficult to measure, wage rates for workers
of various seniorities are observable. In Section 1.4, we hypothesize that the difference
between the wage rates of senior and junior workers are determined through bargaining
between senior workers and firms. Only a fraction of the gains in productivity is reflected
in the wage. This gives rise to our calibration strategy for θS/θJ : we estimate the wage
return to seniority from the data, and calibrate θS/θJ so that the average wage difference
between senior and junior workers in our model matches that in the data.
Existing estimations of the return to seniority include Topel (1991), Altonji and
Shakotko (1987), and Altonji and Williams (2005), among others. We extend the
methodology of Topel (1991) and Altonji and Williams (2005) to more recent sam-
ples of CPS and PSID in order to compare the return to seniority before and after the
mid-1980s.
1.6.1 Determining the Return to Seniority from CPS
We estimate the return to seniority following the methodology of Topel (1991). We
employ data from the Current Population Survey using the Displaced Workers, Occu-
pational Mobility and Job Tenure supplements. In this survey, we are able to identify
workers who were displaced from jobs as a result of economic reasons (layoffs and plant
closings). We use the loss in wages for workers who were displaced to discipline our
estimation of the return to seniority.
Using data from the Displaced Worker supplement of the CPS data is advantageous
for a number of reasons. First, experience and tenure tend to move together, making it
difficult to identify the contribution of each. Since separation does not alter a worker’s
21 Still, there do exist some attempts in the literature to identify the gains in worker productivity
from experience without relying on the wage data. One attempt at quantifying the gains to experience
is Shaw and Lazear (2008). They study a firm which installs windshields where output can be quantified
and directly linked to individual workers. A main finding is that there is a very steep learning curve
over the first 8 months on the job (53%). Further, their data show that these output gains with tenure
are not reflected in equal percentage pay gains: pay profiles are much flatter than output profiles in
the first year and a half on the job. Installing windshields has a relatively easy learning curve. Still,
there are substantial gains to tenure which are not associated with an equivalent gain in wage providing
support that workers are a form of investment.
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experience but does change tenure, we attribute changes in the wage prior to displace-
ment and post displacement to the return to tenure.22 Second, the CPS data permits
us to limit the selection bias of separation. Workers were displaced from their jobs for
exogenous reasons instead of endogenous ones such as incapability of workers or bad
match quality between workers and jobs.
The average change in real wages after an exogenous job loss across all employees is
displayed in Figure 1.11. The drop in wages is affected by the business cycle. Specif-
ically, the survey conducted immediately following each recession yields a larger drop
in wages than the average drop experienced in surrounding observations.23 Panel
A of Figure 1.11 includes all data points whereas Panel B of Figure 1.11 excludes the
first point following each NBER recession. The series are overlaid with the average
labor productivity data from Figure 1.2. The figure demonstrates a strong comovement
between changes in the real wage and patterns in labor productivity over the business
cycle. This provides suggestive evidence linking our mechanism and result.
The observed fall in wages for the single data point in 1973 was 2.75%. The average
fall in wages across all subsequent points is 17.25%. If the points immediately following
each recession are dropped, the fall in wages is 12.95%.
Using cross-sectional U.S. data, Christofides and Oswald (1992), Blanchflower et al.
(1996), and Hildreth and Oswald (1997) estimate that a 1% increase in a firm’s prof-
itability leads to an increase in wages between 0.01% and 0.08%. Therefore, we choose
a bargaining weight of φ = 5% for senior workers.
From the average drop in wage and the bargaining weight above, we obtain an
estimate for the relative productivity between senior and junior workers of θS/θJ = 1.55
for periods prior to 1983, and θS/θJ = 4.45 for periods after 1983 (θS/θJ = 3.59 if points
immediately following recessions are excluded).
Estimating the return to tenure from the Displaced Worker supplement of CPS is
subject to several potential limitations. First, the loss in wage following a displacement
may be due to factors other than the loss in seniority (e.g. scarring). This would
22 Depending on the year of the survey, those interviewed are asked if they were displaced in the
preceding 1 to 5 years. Consequently, we are unaware of the exact year of displacement. The fact that
general experience tends to increase wages causes our estimate of θS/θJ to be biased downwards both
for older and more recent recessions.
23 This has also been documented by Davis and Wachter (2011).
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lead to an upward bias in our estimation of returns to tenure. Second, since wage loss
can only be calculated for workers who found a new job after displacement, we are
missing the wage loss for workers who fail to find a new job. This selection may lead
to a downward bias in our estimation of the percentage loss in wage. Finally, the CPS
Displaced Workers supplement contains relevant wage data only for years 1973, 1984,
1986, ..., up to 2010. As a result, 1973 is the only data point that can discipline our
choice of θS/θJ for periods prior to 1983.24
1.6.2 Determining the Return to Seniority from the PSID
Due to the limitations of the CPS data, we also estimate the return to seniority using
the methods of Altonji and Williams (2005). We update their estimations using more
recent waves from the PSID.
Altonji and Williams (2005) use an instrumental variable approach to estimate the
returns to seniority from 1975 to 1991. Unlike the CPS Displaced Worker supplement,
job changes in PSID were not entirely due to exogenous reasons. This introduces some
endogeneity problems. The increase in wage following a one-year increase in tenure is
potentially an upward-biased measure of the return to seniority due to selection. For
example, a good worker, or a good match between worker and job leads to both longer
tenure and higher wage payment.
Altonji and Williams (2005) use the demeaned tenure over time for each job match
as the instrument for tenure.25 Their IV1 estimator reported a 10-year return to
seniority of 5.42% for the period from 1975 to 1982, and 13.91% for the period from
1983 to 1991. We extend the methodology of Altonji and Williams (2005) to include
more recent waves of the PSID. Additionally, instead of using the 10-year return, we
calculate the return to tenure using the average tenure of the sample period. Using our
updated data and methodology, average return to tenure is 4.84% from 1972 to 1982
and 13.02% from 1983 to 2013. Combining these numbers with a bargaining weight of
5% implies a θS/θJ = 1.97 for older recessions and θS/θJ = 3.60 for newer recessions.
For our subsequent simulations, we select θS/θJ = 2 for recessions prior to the
24 Additional information is delegated to Appendix A.6.
25 Details of their regression method are delegated to Section A.7 of the Appendix.
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mid-1980s and θS/θJ = 3.5 for recessions after.26
1.6.3 Parametrization
Our model includes 11 parameters in the stationary equilibrium and an additional pa-
rameter to determine the magnitude of the shock. The parameters in our model are
selected to levels standard in the literature or calibrated to match certain moments in
the data. Following Greenwood et al. (1988), we remove the wealth effect on labor
supply by adopting the GHH preference of the form u (c, L) =
[
c−L1+ν
1+ν
]1−γ
−1
1−γ .
Each period in our model represents a quarter. The household discount factor β is
set to be 0.99 to match an annual interest rate of 4%. The risk aversion parameter γ is
set to 3. Labor share in the production function is chosen to be α = 0.65.
Business cycle models with endogenous labor supply usually have difficulty simul-
taneously matching the nearly acyclical movement of wage rates and the procyclical
movement of employment. A labor elasticity consistent with the micro literature gen-
erates too little fluctuation in employment or too much fluctuation in the wage relative
to what we observe in the data. In order to simultaneously align with these two facts,
a larger labor elasticity is required. Here, we set ν = 0.2 which implies an elasticity
of labor supply equal to 5. If a lower elasticity of labor supply is selected, our model
is still able to deliver a slower speed of employment recovery. However, it generates
a smaller initial drop in employment than observed in the data. As an alternative to
using a high labor elasticity, we can introduce wage rigidity which allows us to match
these facts even with a perfectly inelastic labor supply.
ζ measures the probability of a junior worker acquiring firm-specific skills and tran-
sitioning into a senior worker. We select ζ = 0.125 so it takes 2 years (8 quarters) on
average for a junior worker to transition into senior. This is consistent with Altonji
and Williams (2005) which mentions that “all the estimation methods suggest that the
26 Our calibration of the ratio θS/θJ = 2 for pre-1985 recessions is consistent with findings of Frazis
and Loewenstein (2006) who use 1982 EOPP data to measure growth in productivity over the first two
years of employment. They find that productivity of workers increases by 80% over the first two years,
and that productivity growth is only partially reflected in wage growth.
In our model, all firm-specific human capital is lost upon separation. In reality, some firm-specific
skills may be retained across job transitions (i.e. in the case of recall). Our identification strategy
estimates only that portion of firm-specific human capital which is lost because any retained portion of
firm-specific skills will not lead to a drop in wages.
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return to seniority declines sharply after the first year or two”. This also provides a
fairly good approximation to our fitted return to tenure outlined in Section 1.6.2. In
Figure 1.12, we plot the fitted return to tenure using the data from the PSID over the
expected return to tenure in our calibrated model.
Table 1.2: Externally Calibrated Parameters
Param. Description Value Source
β Discount Rate 0.99 Annual Interest Rate 4%
γ CRRA Parameter 3 Business Cycle Literature
α Labor Share 0.65 65% Labor Share
φ Bargaining Weight for Workers 0.05 Literature‡
ζ Probability Junior Turns Senior 0.125 Altonji and Williams (2005)
ν Inverse of Labor Elasticity 0.2 Elasticity of Labor Supply 5
‡Christofides and Oswald (1992), Blanchflower et al. (1996) and Hildreth and Oswald (1997).
We calibrate the remaining parameters of our model to reproduce a series of aggre-
gate moments from the U.S. data. In particular, the exogenous separation rate between
firms and workers is chosen to be δ = 10% to match the average job destruction rate of
continuing firms from 1977 to 2013 from the Business Dynamics Statistics data. This
also results in an average employment spell of approximately 2.5 years across all em-
ployees which is consistent with Shimer (2005).27 The firm-specific productivity z
is i.i.d. across firms and over time following a log-normal distribution. The mean of
the shock is calibrated to match an average firm size of 16. The standard deviation
of the shock is calibrated to match the average one-year cumulative default rate of 2%
(Standard and Poor’s). Exogenous exit rate of firms ξ is calibrated to match the 10%
average exit rate of firms as in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006).
Selection of θS/θJ and the bargaining weight φ were discussed in the previous section.
Our model focuses on the recovery following a recession. Recent work by Bloom
et al. (2014) and Stock and Watson (2012) suggest that second moment rather than first
moment shocks to TFP may be chiefly responsible for driving business cycle dynamics.
Additionally, a negative TFP shock directly influences labor productivity, mechanically
generating a procyclical pattern. In alignment with this literature and to disentangle
27 To be more exact, our selection of δ results in an average employment spell of 2.56 years for older
recessions and 2.90 years for more recent recessions.
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Table 1.3: Internally Calibrated Parameters
Param. Description Value Target Model
δ Exog. Separation Rate 8% Avg. Emp. Spell 2.5 Years 2.5
µ Mean of Prod. Shock 5.6, 4.4 Avg. Est. Size 16 16
σ Std. Dev. of Prod. Shock 0.15 S&P 1-Yr Avg Cumu. Def. Rate 2% 2%
ξ Exog. Exit Rate of Firms 8% Avg Exit Rate 10% ‡ 10%
θJ Junior Prod. 1 Normalization
θSold Senior Prod. (pre-1985) 2 Ret. to Tenure 1972-1982 4.84% 4.9%
θSnew Senior Prod. (post-1985) 3.5 Ret. to Tenure 1983-2013 13.02% 13.0%
‡ Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006).
our mechanism from the first moment TFP shock we simulate recessions using shocks
that preserve the mean of TFP. In particular, in Section 1.7 recessions are simulated by
a shock to the second moment of TFP (which results in a larger than normal fraction
of firms to exit). These exiting firms are replaced by firms that start over from size
zero and gradually grow back to the mature size, which is driving the recovery. As a
robustness check, Appendix A.8 analyzes a simpler shock in which we exogenously force
a fraction of firms to exit. The unexpected variance shock increase disproportionately
causes a larger fraction of smaller firms to exit but both shocks feature similar business
cycle dynamics. As a final exercise, in Appendix A.9, we simulate a recession using a
temporary shock to the first moment of TFP.
1.7 Business Cycle Properties
Using the parameters from Section 1.6, we now compare the business cycle properties of
output, employment, and average labor productivity generated by our model to those
in the data. Specifically, we compare our model to the data for the largest recession
in our sample period before and after the mid-1980s: the 1973 recession and the 2008
recession.
Our model accounts for the slower employment recovery between the 1973 and the
2008 recessions. It also qualitatively matches the procyclical pattern of average labor
productivity for the 1973 recession and the countercyclical pattern for the 2008 recession.
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1.7.1 Model Transition Problem
Our model focuses on the recovery following a recession. Recessions are simulated as a
one-time, unexpected variance shock to z. This shock results in a larger than expected
share of firms to exit who are separated from their senior workers. In the data, smaller
(or younger) firms are more likely to exit during a downturn than larger (or older)
firms. Modeling shocks as an increase in the second moment of z has the added benefit
of endogenously aligning with this pattern. Recovery is driven by new firms replacing
the exiting firms growing from size zero back to the mature size. We compare the
recovery paths of output, employment and labor productivity of our model with those
in the data.28
Let the shock happen in period t = 0. Assume that it takes T periods for the
economy to return to the stationary equilibrium. The Bellman equation for firms is
given by
V 1t
(
nS
)
=
max
nJ
∫
z∗t (nS ,nJ )
{
z
[
nJθJ + nSθS
]α
− [wSt (nS , nJ)nS + wJt (nS , nJ)nJ]Rt (nS , nJ)
}
f (z) dz
+Λt,t+1
[
1− (1− F (z∗t (nS , nJ))) (1− ξ)]V 1t+1 (0)
+Λt,t+1
(
1− F (z∗t (nS , nJ))) (1− ξ)V 1t+1 ((1− δ) (nS + ζnJ))
where Λt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for the household between period t and
period t+ 1.
Value functions during the transition are indexed by time t. This is because total
output/consumption is changing over the transition which affects the stochastic discount
factors Λt,t+1.
28 As a robustness check Appendix A.8 analyzes a simpler shock in which we exogenously force a
fraction of firms to exit. The unexpected variance shock increase disproportionately causes a larger
fraction of smaller firms to exit but both shocks feature similar business cycle dynamics.
Our model focuses on the portion of business cycle dynamics driven by firm composition. A standard
first-moment TFP shock calibrated to match first-period output loss without any shock to the higher
moments does not generate sufficient disruption to firm composition to match business cycle dynamics
of employment. In Appendix A.9 we use a first-moment TFP shock sufficiently large to match the
drop in employment. This shock closely aligns with dynamics in the data for output, average labor
productivity and employment from the second period onwards but significantly overshoots the drop in
first-period output.
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1.7.2 Transition Intuition
Slower Recovery in Employment
Following a recession, a larger fraction of firms exit relative to the stationary equilibrium.
Consequently, there are more start-up firms and less mature firms. When the economy
is recovering, young firms hire junior workers and gradually grow back to the mature
size. Employment recovery follows.
When θS/θJ is low, the difference between the productivity levels of senior and ju-
nior workers is low. Therefore, start-up firms grow fast, leading to a fast employment
recovery. When θS/θJ is high, start-up firms grow slowly, which leads to a slow employ-
ment recovery. The intuition and policy function comparisons are discussed in Section
1.5.
Change in the Cyclicality of Average Labor Productivity
Average labor productivity in our model is calculated as output per worker. Since senior
and junior workers have different productivity levels, we can decompose the average
labor productivity into two parts: output per effective unit of labor supplied, and the
average effective labor per worker:
ALP =
Y
Total Labor
(1.7)
=
Y
Effective Labor Units
× Effective Labor Units
Total Labor
=
∫
nS
[
θSnS + θJnJ
]α
g
(
nS
)
dnS∫
nS [θ
SnS + θJnJ ] g (nS) dnS︸ ︷︷ ︸
Decreasing Returns to Scale Factor
×
∫
nS
[
θSnS + θJnJ
]
g
(
nS
)
dnS∫
nS [n
S + nJ ] g (nS) dnS︸ ︷︷ ︸
Worker Composition Factor
(1.8)
The first term in Equation (1.8), Y/Effective Labor Units, (henceforth, decreasing
returns to scale factor), measures how efficiently output can be produced with effective
labor units. Due to the decreasing returns to scale technology, this efficiency is higher
when total effective labor is smaller. The second term, Effective Labor Units/Total Labor,
(henceforth, worker composition factor), measures the average amount of effective labor
units provided per worker. It is a weighted average of θS and θJ , with weights equal to
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the shares of senior and junior workers in the economy. The more senior workers there
are, the larger this term will be.
During the transition, the decreasing returns to scale factor and the worker com-
position factor exert opposing forces on average labor productivity. On the one hand,
after a recession, start-up firms desire to grow which results in a larger influx of junior
workers. These junior workers provide a smaller amount of effective labor per worker
than senior workers. This tends to drive down average labor productivity through the
worker composition factor.
On the other hand, during the recovery, the average size of firms in the economy is
smaller than in the stationary equilibrium for two reasons. First, output is small relative
to future periods. This increases the importance of present consumption relative to
future growth and results in a smaller average firm size. Second, the shock causes a
fraction of firms to exit. Owners of exiting firms start new firms of size zero and engage
in cautious hiring. They are smaller than their fully-grown counterparts. Because of the
decreasing returns to scale production technology, a smaller average firm size increases
average labor productivity.29
When θS/θJ is low, start-up firms grow fast by hiring a lot of junior workers. The
composition effect from the lower productivity of junior workers outweighs the decreas-
ing returns to scale effect. This results in a procyclical pattern of average labor pro-
ductivity. When θS/θJ is high, recovery is slower. Start-up firms are more cautious in
their hiring of junior workers. The downward pressure of less productive junior workers
is diluted across time. This causes the decreasing returns to scale force to dominate.
As a result, a countercyclical pattern of average labor productivity emerges.
Figure 1.13 plots this decomposition of average labor productivity. The left panel
corresponds to the fast recovery economy (θS/θJ = 2), and the right panel corresponds
to the slow recovery economy (θS/θJ = 3.5). In each panel, the red line plots average
labor productivity during the transition. It is decomposed into output per effective
labor unit (decreasing returns to scale effect, blue line) and effective labor per worker
(worker composition effect, green line). Comparing the worker composition effect of
29 Our model abstracts from capital. Empirically, over the business cycle, the fluctuations in em-
ployment are not fully matched by changes in capital. Consequently there is more capital available per
worker during recessions. This serves as our motivation for modeling production using a decreasing
returns to scale technology in labor.
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the slow recovery economy (right panel) with the fast recovery one (left panel), we
observe that the effective labor per worker (green line) falls by significantly less. As
outlined above, this is because firms are hiring junior workers more cautiously in the
slow recovery economy. This slower hiring also results in a slower recovery of GDP. A
more steady consumption path translates into less disruption of the stochastic discount
factor and average firm size. All of this contributes to a weaker decreasing returns to
scale effect. In aggregate, we observe that the worker composition effect outweighs the
decreasing returns to scale effect in the fast recovery economy and vice versa in the slow
recovery economy.
1.7.3 Comparing Model Predictions to the Data
Using the parameter θS calibrated in Section 1.6, we compute the recovery path of
output, employment, and average labor productivity. For the 1973 recession we use
θS = 2, and for the 2008 recession we use θS = 3.5.30 The magnitude of the shock η
is selected to match the percentage drop in output observed from the data.
Figure 1.14 compares the model output from the two different recessions. Since the
magnitude of the recessions vary slightly, the employment series have been normalized
for easier comparison. Specifically, the deviation of employment from the stationary
equilibrium has been set to −100% for the first period of recovery. Normalizing in this
manner allows us to compare the speed of recovery in employment across recessions. As
can be observed in Figure 1.14, an increase in θS/θJ causes a slower speed of recovery
in employment. It also reverses the cyclicality of labor productivity. The causes for this
are outlined in Section 1.7.2.
Next, we overlay the simulation results from our model with the actual data on
output, employment, and labor productivity for the relevant recessions.
In Figure 1.15, we compare the time series of output, employment, and average labor
productivity between our model and the data throughout the recession of 1973. Note
that our model only uses a single parameter, η, to match the data to this particular
recession. No parameter is used to target the speed of output and employment recovery.
30 Here we use the 1973 recession and the 2008 recession as representatives for the older and newer
recessions, respectively. For simulation results regarding other recessions, please refer to Section A.10
of the Appendix for details.
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Instead, the speed of output and employment recovery is endogenously determined by
the speed of firm hiring.
Our model does a reasonable job approximating the speed of recovery in output and
employment, as observed in the left and middle panels of Figure 1.15, given that the only
moment we target is the initial drop. In the middle panel of Figure 1.15, employment
recovers by 1.3% (from −5.5% to −4.2%) in the data over the first year of recovery. Our
model delivers 1.5% employment recovery (from 5.0% to 3.5% ) over this window. In
addition, in our model, employment recovers to the pre-recession level in approximately
three years, which is similar to the data. A more detailed comparison of the recovery
of employment between our model and the data is included in Table 1.4.
From the right panel of Figure 1.15, we see that following the 1973 recession, average
labor productivity dropped with output in the data. Our model delivers this procyclical
pattern in labor productivity. The intuition for this is as follows. In the 1973 recession,
the difference between the productivity levels of senior and junior workers was relatively
small. Therefore, start-up firms grew quickly. This fast growth in employment results
in firms spending little time on the more productive portion of the decreasing returns
to scale technology. However, our model suggests that average labor productivity in the
economy was reduced following the recessions by the large influx of junior workers with
lower productivity.
Figure 1.16 compares our model to the data for the 2008 recession. The only dif-
ference in the parametrization between the 1973 recession and the 2008 recession is a
change in θS and the magnitude of the shock η. Again the model does a fairly good job
at predicting the rate of recovery in output. It also generates a slower rate of recovery
in employment due to the cautious hiring mechanism. Four years after the ending date
of the recession, employment has not recovered to the pre-recession level, in both the
data and our model.
In the 2008 recession, average labor productivity went up while output dropped.
Our model also delivers this counter cyclical pattern in labor productivity (right panel
of Figure 1.16). Intuitively, in 2008 the difference between the productivity levels of
senior and junior workers is relatively large. Therefore, start-up firms grow slowly
for fear of losing their senior workers upon default. This slow growth in employment
dilutes the influx of junior workers over time and weakens the downward pressure of
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junior workers on average labor productivity. Slower hiring also allows firms to operate
at a smaller average size and take advantage of the highly productive portion of the
decreasing returns to scale technology. As a result, average labor productivity rises over
the recovery path.
1.7.4 A Partial Explanation for Jobless Recovery
By normalizing actual employment data from the two recessions using the same method,
we are able to calculate how much of the slower employment recovery can be explained
by our mechanism. This comparison is displayed in Table 1.4. In this table, we calculate
how much employment has recovered relative to its trough after one, two and three years.
For example, employment reaches its trough at 5.5% below its pre-recession level in the
1973 recession. One year after the employment trough, employment is still 4.2% below
its pre-recession level. We calculate the percentage recovery in employment over the
first year as (5.5%− 4.2%) /5.5% = 24%. Calculations are included for both the data
and our model.
Table 1.4: Comparison of Employment Recovery
Years After Percentage Recovery
Emp. Trough Model Data
1973 Recession
1 39% 24%
2 75% 44%
3 89% 84%
2008 Recession
1 34% 20%
2 65% 48%
3 82% 58%
Employment recovery for the 1973 recession features a non-monotone path in the
data. Specifically, employment drops to its trough in 1975 and recovers by 24% from
1975 to 1976. However, it suffers another drop in 1977 (observable in the middle panel
of Figure 1.15). Our model is relatively simple and there is no mechanism in our model
that delivers this “double-dip” feature. Still, our model provides a reasonable match to
the three-year employment recovery statistic. Our model predicts an 89% recovery in
three years which is close to the 84% recovery observed in the data.
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For the 2008 recession, our model predicts 34%, 65%, and 82% cumulative employ-
ment recovery over the first one, two and three years respectively. This is faster than
what we observe in the data (20%, 48%, and 58%). Over a three-year horizon, our
model is only able to account for a portion of the slower employment recovery for the
2008 recession.
Table 1.5: Comparison of Employment Recovery
Years After Percentage Recovery Portion
Emp. Trough Model Data Explained
1973 Recession 3 89% 84%
2008 Recession 3 82% 58%
Difference 7% 26% 27%
By measuring the change in the speed of recovery from 1973 to 2008 as the difference
in the three-year percentage recovery rate, our change in θS/θJ accounts for just over a
quarter (7%/26% = 27%) of the change in the speed of recovery in employment between
1973 and 2008.
1.8 Conclusion
In this paper, we document two changes in the pattern of business cycles starting from
the mid-1980s. First, the speed of recovery in employment has become significantly
slower. Second, labor productivity has switched from being procyclical to acyclical or
even countercyclical. We present a model that contributes to the explanation of both
facts through the variation of a single parameter, namely the relative productivity of
senior to junior workers.
In our model, when a recession occurs, many firms exit and new firms take their
place. This results in two opposing forces on average labor productivity. First, start-
up firms employ a disproportionately large number of junior workers, resulting in a
decrease of average labor productivity. The second and countering force is that, during
the recovery, the average size of firms in the economy is smaller than in the stationary
equilibrium. Due to the decreasing returns to scale production technology, a smaller
average firm size tends to increase average labor productivity. Whether average labor
productivity is procyclical or countercyclical depends on the relative strength of these
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two opposing forces.
In older recessions, the difference between the productivity of senior and junior
workers is low so new firms tend to hire junior workers quickly. This concentrated
influx of junior workers during periods immediately following a recession causes the
downward force in average labor productivity to dominate. Further, since firms grow
quickly, employment also recovers quickly.
As the relative productivity of senior to junior workers increases, senior workers
become more valuable to a firm. Consequently, firms are more cautious (slower) in
hiring in order to avoid losing their stock of senior workers. This results in a slower
recovery in employment. In addition to effects on employment, this slow hiring diffuses
the downward effect on labor productivity across additional periods and results in firms
spending more time on the relatively productive portion of their decreasing returns to
scale technology. In this case, the upward force on average labor productivity dominates
the downward force and results in the countercyclicality of labor productivity observed
in more recent recessions.
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Figure 1.1: Employment Recovery Comparison
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Figure 1.2: Ten Year Centered MA Correlation in Labor Productivity and GDP
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Figure 1.3: The “Fast Recovery” Recessions
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Figure 1.4: The “Slow Recovery” Recessions
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Figure 1.5: Timing
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Figure 1.6: Timing with Value Functions
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Figure 1.7: Wage Compression
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Figure 1.8: Firm Growth Paths for Different Productivity Gaps θS/θJ
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Figure 1.9: Partial and General Equilibrium Effects
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Figure 1.10: Default Probability Comparison
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Figure 1.11: Evidence for Changes in θS/θJ
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Figure 1.12: Return to Tenure
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Figure 1.13: Decomposition of Average Labor Productivity (ALP)
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Figure 1.14: Transition Path Comparison of Models
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Figure 1.15: 1973 Recession: Output, Hours Worked and Labor Productivity
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Quarter
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
Pe
rc
en
t D
ev
ia
tio
n
Output
Model
Data
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Quarter
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
Total Hours Worked
Model
Data
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Quarter
-3
-2
-1
0
1
Labor Productivity
Model
Data
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Authors’ calculations
Figure 1.16: 2008 Recession: Output, Hours Worked and Labor Productivity
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Chapter 2
How Do Financial Frictions
Affect Self-Financing Firms?
2.1 Introduction
Our study of the Great Recession is motivated by three key observations about the
investment and financing behavior of firms.
1. Capital investment by self-financing firms fell significantly. By self-financing firms
we refer to firms that consistently generate more internal funds than capital expen-
diture. The green and blue lines in Figure 2.1 are the average capital expenditure
and cash flow from operating activities of the largest 20% of COMPUSTAT firms
in terms of asset level (henceforth, self-financing firms).1 These self-financing
firms generate higher net cash flows from operating activities than their capital
expenditure, hence are capable of financing their investment without resorting to
external funds. However, during the 2008 recession, their investment dropped by
24%. This pattern was also documented in Chari and Kehoe (2009) and Shourideh
and Zetlin-Jones (2012).
2. Liquid assets holdings by self-financing firms increased during the Great Recession,
especially after the collapse of Lehman. Figure 2.2 plots the time series of average
1 These firms account for more than 30% of the civilian employment. Variables are taken from
balance sheet and cash flow statements from COMPUSTAT.
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Figure 2.1: Capital Expenditures and Available Funds for Self-Financing Firms
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Data source: COMPUSTAT and authors' calculation.
liquid assets holdings of self-financing firms. Liquid assets refer to the balance
sheet item “cash and cash equivalents”.2 This surge in liquid assets holdings
during the Great Recession is robust across sectors and firm sizes.
3. Issuance of bank loans shrank while issuance of corporate bonds expanded. Figure
2.3 is taken from Adrian et al. (2013). It plots the total issuance of bank loans
and corporate bonds for all the COMPUSTAT firms (except financial and utility
firms). We see a decrease in the issuance of bank loans (top panel) and an increase
of bonds issuance (bottom panel) from the onset of the recession. This suggests
that it may be worthwhile to model bank loans and corporate bonds as different
debt instruments. An important distinction between the two is that bank loans
are mainly in the form of revolving credit lines.3
These three facts cannot be simultaneously accounted for in models with collateral con-
straints or productivity shocks. In a standard model with financial frictions, a tightening
2 Henceforth, we use liquid assets and cash interchangeably.
3 Survey of Terms of Business Lending conducted by Federal Reserve Board reveals that 77% of
C&I loans are made under commitment according to survey conducted on May 2014.
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Figure 2.2: Liquid Assets Holdings for Self-Financing Firms
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Liquid assets refer to the item “cash and cash equivalents (CHE)” from COMPUSTAT balance
sheet data.
of the collateral constraint forces firms to reduce their capital investment. However, self-
financing firms have enough internal funds to finance their capital expenditure, and do
not have to resort to external funds. Therefore, it is not clear how a tightening of the
collateral constraint would lead to reduced investment by these firms. In a standard
RBC model, a negative productivity shock generates a drop in corporate investment.
However, it does not have clear predictions about corporate liquid assets holdings. In
fact, we show later that a negative productivity shock reduces firm’s liquid assets hold-
ings under the assumption that liquidity shocks are proportional to the level of capital
stock, as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). Macroeconomic models with corporate bor-
rowing usually ignore heterogeneity in corporate debt structure, hence cannot address
the opposite behavior of bank loans and corporate bonds during the Great Recession.
To jointly account for the three observations above, we propose a model where capital
investment is subject to liquidity shocks, which we model as unexpected cost that firms
have to finance right away before their operations can be continued. As in Holmstrom
and Tirole (1998), we interpret liquidity shocks as “cost overrun of the initial investment
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Figure 2.3: New Issuance of Loans and Corporate Bonds
Top panel: new issuance of bank loans
Bottom panel: new issuance of corporate bonds.
Source: Adrian et al. (2013)
or a shortfall of revenue relative to operating expense during the intermediate period”.
Liquidity shocks have to be financed by either drawing down bank credit lines or selling
liquid assets. In this environment, we study how an exogenous reduction of the credit
lines available to firms (henceforth credit line shock) impacts their investment and cash
holdings decisions.
The intuition why a credit line shock can simultaneously account for firm’s invest-
ment and liquid assets holdings behavior is as follows. Bank credit lines and liquid assets
are substitutes for insuring against liquidity shocks and safeguarding capital investment.
Given the amount of credit lines available, firms have to bundle one unit of capital with
certain units of liquid assets to cover the remaining liquidity risk. When banks tighten
the credit lines, firms have to bundle extra units of liquid assets with each unit of capital
to cover the increased liquidity risk. Holding liquid assets, however, is costly because of
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their low return. This increases the marginal cost of capital investment. Hence, firms
optimally reduce their capital investment.
The assumption that credit lines serve as substitutes to cash holdings against liquid-
ity shocks during the Great Recession is supported by the empirical finding in Almeida
et al. (2014). In particular, they showed that at firm level “there is a strong negative
correlation between cash holdings and credit lines in the crisis”.
The exogenous tightening of bank credit during the Great Recession is supported
by the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey conducted by the Federal Reserve Board.
As shown in Figure 2.4, the net percentage of domestic banks that have tightened their
lending standards of commercial and industrial loans to large and middle-market firms
increased from 25% at the beginning of 2008 to more than 75% at the peak of the
recession.
Figure 2.4: Net Percentage of Domestic Banks that have Tightened Lending Standards
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Data source: Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey.
We calibrate the model to firm-level balance sheet information from COMPUSTAT
and compare the transition dynamics of the model economy after a standard credit
shock, a productivity shock, and a credit line shock. We find that:
1. A standard credit shock does not affect high net worth (hence unconstrained)
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firms, leaving their capital expenditure and cash holdings unchanged.
2. A productivity shock generates a decrease of capital expenditure across firm sizes.
But it implies a counter-factual reduction in firms’ liquid assets holdings.
3. A credit line shock generates a decrease in capital expenditure as well as an in-
crease in liquid assets holdings across firm sizes.
4. A credit line shock also generates a change in the composition of bank loans and
corporate bonds as in the data.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 reviews literature. Section 2.3 presents
a simple two-period example to illustrate our model trade-offs. Section 2.4 sets up
the full-fledged recursive model. Section 2.5 studies the quantitative properties of our
model. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
Our empirical findings are novel as we are the first to jointly document corporate financ-
ing, liquid assets holdings and corporate investment behavior for self-financing firms.
Chari and Kehoe (2009) and Shourideh and Zetlin-Jones (2012) document that a large
fraction of US corporations are able to self-finance their investment. There is also a
large and growing literature studying why large corporations choose to hold more cash
from 1980 on. For recent study on this issue, see for example Pinkowitz et al. (2012).
Our model is also related to the literature on financial frictions such as Khan and
Thomas (2013) and Jermann and Quadrini (2012), or earlier ones like Bernanke and
Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). This literature focuses on the role
of bank debt as a source of external financing for investment. We focus instead on its
role as revolving credit lines that provides firms with the flexibility of financing liquidity
shocks. We show that adding this more realistic feature into the model helps to improve
the model’s cross-sectional predictions.
Our paper is also related to the literature on corporate liquidity management prac-
tices initiated by Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). We embed firm’s liquidity management
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decision into a quantitative heterogeneous firms framework, and conduct numerical ex-
periments to demonstrate that it can help us to think about corporate investment
behavior of firms, especially during the Great Recession.
Lastly, our paper is related to a recent literature studying the implications of cor-
porate debt structure on the macroeconomy, such as Fiore and Uhlig (2011), Fiore and
Uhlig (2015) and Crouzet (2013). These papers study how firms choose between bank
loans and corporate bonds. We study a different trade-off between bank loan and corpo-
rate bonds from these authors. Specifically, in our model bank loans are a more flexible
source of financing that can be used to finance firm’s liquidity shocks, as documented
in Sufi (2009).
2.3 Model: Two-Period Example
In this section, we present a two-period example to explain the main intuition of our
model.
Firms in the economy operate a decreasing returns to scale production technology,
converting capital k into output y = zkα. The production technology of firms is subject
to liquidity shocks as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). Specifically, after capital k has
been installed but before output y is produced, a random additional cost of ρk has to be
paid right away before production can continue. We interpret liquidity shocks as “cost
overrun of the initial investment or a shortfall of revenue relative to operating expense
during the intermediate period”.
In addition to the decreasing returns production technology that is prone to liquidity
shocks, firms also have access to a liquid saving technology with a constant return of
one. This technology can be thought of as checking accounts at banks. At the end of
each period, firms decide how to split their assets between capital investment k and
liquid saving m.
Firms can issue bonds at interest rate R. They also have access to credit lines from
banks. The credit lines are collateralized to the physical capital of the firms. The credit
limit for a firm with capital stock k is ξk for some exogenous parameter ξ. Firms can
finance the investment in capital by either issuing bonds b or drawing down their credit
line. However, liquidity shocks can only be paid using credit lines or liquid saving m.
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They cannot be financed using bonds. This is because bond issuance usually involves
paperwork and preparations such as Security and Exchange Commission filings, which
takes relatively long time to complete.
The timing of the model is as follows. In period 1, firms choose how much capital
investment k to make. They also decide how much liquid saving m to make. Firms have
0 net worth (assume this for simplicity). All the investment and saving are financed
by either issuing corporate bonds b or drawing down its bank credit line lk.
4 On
the morning of period 2, a liquidity shock5 ρk is realized. It can be financed either
with saving m or by drawing down bank credit line lρ.
6 In the afternoon, output
y is produced. Firms make payment on corporate bonds and the used portion of their
credit lines.
Figure 2.5: Timing (Two-Period)
Period 1 Period 2
Portfolio decision: 
• Capital investment: k
• Liquidity asset holding: m
Liquidity shock
ρk is realized
Financing decision: 
• Issue bond: b
• Borrow from credit line: lk
ρk can be financed with:
• Either: Liquid asset holding: m
• Or: Borrowing from credit line: lρ
lρ + lk ≤ ξk
Output zkα
is produced
Repay:
• Bond: b
• Credit balance: lρ + lk
Our model features both inter-period and intra-period borrowing. Corporate bond
is issued in period 1 and repaid in period 2. Therefore, it carries an interest rate of R.
Bank credit line can be used for either investment purpose or liquidity purpose. The
4 Here the subscript k in lk denotes that part of the credit line that is drawn down for capital
investment purpose.
5 A liquidity shock is an unexpected cost that firms have to finance right away before their operations
can be continued. As in Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), we interpret liquidity shocks as “cost overrun
of the initial investment or a shortfall of revenue relative to operating expense during the intermediate
period”.
6 Here the subscript ρ in lρ denotes the part of the credit line that is drawn down to finance the
liquidity shock ρk.
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portion of the credit line used for investment purpose is an inter-period loan and carries
an interest rate of R. The portion of the credit line used to pay the liquidity shock is
an intra-period loan and carries an interest rate of one.
Firms solve the following problem:
pi(ξ) = max
k,m,b,lk,lρ
zkα −R (b+ lk)− lρ
s.t. m+ k ≤ b+ lk (2.1)
m+ lρ ≥ ρk (2.2)
lk + lρ ≤ ξk (2.3)
Equation (2.1) is the budget constraint of firms: total investment in capital stock and
liquid assets cannot exceed the total amount of funds firms are able to raise. Equation
(2.2) is the liquidity constraint: liquidity shocks have to be financed by either liquid
asset holding or bank credit line. Finally, Equation (2.3) is the credit limit constraint of
firms: total draw-down of bank credit line for either capital investment or liquid shock
financing cannot exceed firm’s credit limit ξk.
To analytically characterize the solution to firm’s problem, the following assumptions
are made:
Assumption 1 Inter-period interest rate R and liquidity shock ξ satisfy:
1. R > 1: inter-period borrowing rate is higher than intra-period borrowing rate.
2. ξ ≤ ρ: credit line itself is not sufficient to cover the liquidity shock.
Lemma 3 Under Assumption 1, the optimal solution to firm’s problem is characterized
by:
1. m > 0
2. lk = 0
3. lρ = ξk
4. αzkα−1 = R(1 + ρ)− (1−R) ξ
That is, firm holds positive liquid asset, uses none of the credit line for financing capital
investment, and saves the entire credit line for hedging the liquidity shock.
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Intuitively, the liquidity shock has be to financed through either liquid asset holding m
or bank credit line lρ. Liquid saving m carries an opportunity cost of R > 1 due to its
low return. Therefore, firm minimizes their liquid asset holding and reserves the entire
bank credit line for financing liquidity shock.
Proof 1 From (2.1) and (2.3) of the problem, we get: m ≥ ρk− lρ ≥ ρk− ξk+ lk > 0.
Note that k > 0 because the marginal return to capital approaches infinity at 0.
Suppose at the optimal solution lk > 0. Consider a perturbation as follows: reduce
both m and lk by ε > 0 and increase lρ by ε; keep k, b constant. This is feasible because
both m and lk are strictly positive. One can verify that all constraints are satisfied. This
perturbation increases profit by (R− 1)ε > 0. Contradiction! So lk = 0.
If at the optimal solution lρ < ξk, then a perturbation of increasing lρ by ε > 0 and
decreasing m by ε increases profit of the firm.
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1,
1. A tightening of the credit limit reduces capital investment:
∂k
∂ξ
> 0.
2. A tightening of the credit limit increases bond issuance:
∂b
∂ξ
< 0.
Proof 2 From Lemma 3, we know that lρ = ξk and m = (ρ− ξ)k. Plug them into the
objective function of the firm and take the first order condition, we get:
αAkα−1 = R(ρ− ξ + 1) + ξ = R(ρ+ 1)− (R− 1)ξ
So the marginal cost of capital increases as ξ decreases. Hence k decreases as ξ
decreases.
Because b = R(ρ− ξ + 1)k = R(ρ− ξ + 1)[R(ρ+1)−(R−1)ξαA ]1/(α−1)
The intuition is as follows. As credit limit tightens, firms are forced to hold more cash
per unit of capital investment. This increases the opportunity cost of investment and
reduces optimal capital stock.
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2.4 General Model
In this section, we extend the two-period example into an infinite-horizon economy. In
the two-period example, liquidity shock ρ is assumed to be a constant. In this section,
we allow liquidity shocks to be stochastic (ρ is a random variable). This generalization
is consistent with the corporate liquidity management literature. It also facilitates our
calibration in Section 2.5.
2.4.1 Firms
There is a unit measure of firms in the economy. Firms operate a decreasing returns
to scale production technology y = zkα converting capital k into output y. z is an
economy-wide productivity level (which is assumed be to a constant). All the firms are
producing a homogeneous output.
The timing of the model is in Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.6: Timing
Period t
Portfolio decision: 
• Capital investment: kt+1
• Liquidity asset holding: mt+1
Liquidity shock
ρkt is realized
Financing decision: 
• Pay dividends: 𝑑𝑡
• Issue bond: bt+1
• Borrow from credit line: lk,t+1
ρk financed with:
• Liquid asset holding: mt
• Bank credit line: lρ,t
Output zk𝑡
α
is produced
Repay:
• Bond: bt
• Credit balance: lρ,𝑡 + lk,t
State:
kt, mt, bt, lk,t
Firms walk into period t with capital stock kt, cash holdings mt, corporate bond
outstanding bt, and credit line debt outstanding l
k
t . A liquidity shock ρkt is realized,
where ρ is i.i.d. across firms and over time with distribution g(ρ) ∼ N(µρ, σ2ρ). The
liquidity shock is the amount of money that a firm has to pay right away before the
project can be continued. It can be financed by either drawing down the remaining
credit line
(
ξkt − lkt
)
(we will explain in the next subsection 2.4.2 the interpretations for
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this credit limit ξkt), or using cash holdings mt. We assume that bond issuance is less
flexible and hence cannot be contingent on the realization of the liquidity shock. This is
motivated by the lengthy Security and Exchange Commission filling procedure and the
high flotation cost such as underwriting fees, legal fees and registration fees associated
with bond issuance, as documented in Krishnaswami et al. (1999).
If a firm manages to finance the liquidity shocks, it proceeds to the production stage
and produces f(kt). It pays back banks and bondholders, issues new bonds bt+1, draws
down next-period credit line lkt+1, pays out dividends dt, and makes capital investment
kt+1 and cash holdings mt+1 decisions for the next period. If a liquidity shock is not
financed, the firm will lose all its capital stock kt and cash holdings mt. The firm exits
the market and is replaced by a new firm.
In order to get a stationary distribution of the net worth of the firms, we assume
that there is some exogenous bankruptcy probability θ for each firm in each period.
Firm’s optimization problem could be summarized as the following Bellman equation:
V (k,m, b, lk) = max
ρ∗,d(ρ),b′(ρ),l′
k
(ρ),k′(ρ),m′(ρ)
∫
ρ≤ρ∗
[
d (ρ) + βθV
(
k′ (ρ) ,m′ (ρ) , b′ (ρ) , l′k (ρ)
)]
g(ρ)dρ
s.t. ρ∗k ≤ m+ (ξk − lk) (2.4)
d (ρ) + k′ (ρ) +m′ (ρ) + ρk + b+ lk (2.5)
≤ qb · b′ (ρ) + qlk · l′k (ρ) + f (k) + (1− δ) k +m, ∀ρ ≤ ρ∗ (2.6)
qb = qG
(
m′ (ρ) + ξk′ (ρ)− l′k (ρ)
k′ (ρ)
)
(2.7)
qlk = qG
(
m′ (ρ) + ξk′ (ρ)− l′k (ρ)
k′ (ρ)
)
(2.8)
where ρ∗ is the cutoff level for the liquidity shocks chosen by the firm: a liquidity shock
of ρk will be financed if and only if ρ ≤ ρ∗. d (ρ) is the dividend distributed to the
households, k′ (ρ) ,m′ (ρ) are capital investment and cash holdings for the next period,
b′ (ρ) is the issuance of new bonds, and l′k (ρ) is the draw down of the new credit line.
Equation (2.4) is the credit limit on bank credit lines and Equation (2.5) is the budget
constraint of the firm. Equation (2.7) and Equation (2.8) are interest rate schedules
on bonds and credit lines, which are the risk-free rate q adjusted for the probability
of going bankruptcy of the firm. Note that the portion of the credit line lk used for
investment purpose is an inter-period loan and carries an interest rate of 1qlk
, while the
portion lρ used for financing the liquidity shock is an intra-period loan and carries an
interest rate of 1.
To simplify the optimization problem of the firm, we need the following lemma first:
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Lemma 4 V (k,m, b, lk) = V (k,m− ε, b, lk − ε) ,∀0 < ε < min (m, lk), i.e., value func-
tion V only depends on the difference between m and lk.
Proof 3 From the Bellman equation, m and lk show up only in the credit limit con-
straint (2.4) and the budget constraint (2.5). In both locations, only m− lk matters.
This lemma leads to the following proposition stating that bank credit lines will only
be used for financing liquidity shocks when cash holdings are positive.
Proposition 2 If m′ (ρ) > 0, then l′k (ρ) = 0
7 , i.e. whenever the firm chooses to
hold positive cash m′ (ρ) for the next period, it won’t draw down its credit line l′k (ρ) for
the purpose of capital investment. I.e., it will save all its credit line for financing the
liquidity shock in the coming period.
Proof 4 Suppose m′ (ρ) > 0 and l′k (ρ) > 0. Then the following perturbation will make
the firm better off:
Reduce both m′ (ρ) and l′k (ρ) by ε > 0.
This perturbation doesn’t affect the continuation payoff to the firm which is proved
in Lemma 2. It doesn’t affect the price schedule of bond and credit line either which we
could see from (2.7) and (2.8).
However, it relaxes the budget constraint of this period since l′k (ρ) carries an interest
rate of 1qlk
> 1. Therefore, firms are strictly better off than before. Contradiction.
Intuitively, credit line is a cheaper instrument to finance liquidity shocks than cash.
This is because credit line (used for financing the liquidity shock) is an intra-period
loan carrying an interest rate of 1 while cash has to be set aside and carried over from
last period and hence carries an inter-period interest rate. A firm will only hold positive
cash if its credit line isn’t enough to finance the liquidity shock in the intermediate
period. In that case, it will optimally not waste any of the credit line for financing
capital investment.
Since our model is trying to explain the cash holdings behavior of firms, parameters
are calibrated so that firms have positive cash holdings. As a result, we may assume
7 Note: m′ and l′k here denote the policy function for the next period cash holding and credit line
usage. They are NOT derivatives.
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without loss of generality here that cash holdings are positive and none of the credit
line is used for capital investment. This simplifies the timing (Figure 2.7) and firm’s
Bellman equation to:
Figure 2.7: Timing (simplified)
Period t
Portfolio decision: 
• Capital investment: kt+1
• Liquidity asset holding: mt+1
Liquidity shock
ρkt is realized
Financing decision: 
• Pay dividends: dt
• Issue bond: bt+1
ρk financed with:
• Liquid asset holding: mt
• Bank credit line: lt
Output zkt
α
is produced
Repay:
• Bond: bt
• Credit balance: lt
State:
kt, mt, bt
Firm’s Bellman equation:
V (k,m, b) = max
ρ∗,d(ρ),b′(ρ),k′(ρ),m′(ρ)
∫
ρ≤ρ∗
[
d (ρ) + βθV
(
k′ (ρ) ,m′ (ρ) , b′ (ρ)
)]
g(ρ)dρ
s.t. ρ∗k ≤ m+ ξk
d (ρ) + k′ (ρ) +m′ (ρ) + ρk + b
≤ qb · b′ (ρ) + f (k) + (1− δ) k +m,∀ρ ≤ ρ∗
qb = qG
(
m′ (ρ) + ξk′ (ρ)
k′ (ρ)
)
2.4.2 Bonds and Bank Credit Lines
As discussed above in firm’s problem, firms issue one-period corporate bonds b′ (ρ).
Interest schedule on bonds takes into account the bankruptcy probability of the firms:
qb = qG
(
m′ (ρ) + ξk′ (ρ)
k′ (ρ)
)
Bank loans come in the form of credit lines with credit limits. For a firm with capital
stock kt, its credit limit is ξkt. We motivate this credit limit as a result of renegotiation
process between firms and banks when credit line debt becomes due. To be concrete, we
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assume that firms cannot commit to pay back their credit lines. When the credit line
debt becomes due, firms have the option of renegotiating with banks about how much
money they will pay back. If the renegotiation fails, banks will seize firm’s capital stock
kt and liquidate it in the market at some exogenous price ξ. Therefore, no matter how
much banks lend to the firms during the lending stage, ξkt is the maximum amount
of money banks can get back during the pay-back stage (outside option of the banks).
For simplicity, we assume firms make take-it-or-leave-it offers during the renegotiation
stage and hence banks will get no more than their outside option. This motivates the
credit limit of ξkt on the credit lines.
2.4.3 Household
Household’s problem is relatively simple. They consume the dividends paid out by the
firms and save in the bond market. Households are risk averse and discount future at
rate β. In the stationary equilibrium risk free rate q = β.
W (b) = max
c,b′
U(c) + βW (b′)
s.t. c+ b ≤ qb′ +D
where D is the aggregate dividends paid out to the households. Denote the policy
functions of the households by ch, bh.
2.4.4 Equilibrium
Definition 2 A stationary equilibrium is a collection of functions V,W,m′, d′, k′, b′, ch, bh
and the risk free rate q such that:
1. Given q, V,m′, d′, k′, b′ solve individual firm’s problem;
2. Given q, W, ch, bh solve household’s problem;
3. Goods market and bonds market clear.
2.5 Quantitative Analysis
To facilitate a comparison of our credit line shocks with shocks to the standard borrowing
constraint (henceforth standard credit shocks), we add a standard borrowing constraint
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(2.9) to the previous analyzed problem. Specifically, we numerically solve the following
problem:
V (k,m, b) = max
d(ρ),b′(ρ),k′(ρ),m′(ρ)
∫
ρk≤m+ξk
[
d (ρ) + βθV
(
k′ (ρ) ,m′ (ρ) , b′ (ρ)
)]
g(ρ)dρ
s.t. d (ρ) + k′ (ρ) +m′ (ρ) + (ρk −m) + b ≤ qb · b′ (ρ) + f (k) + (1− δ) k
qb = qG
(
m′ (ρ) + ξk′ (ρ)
k′ (ρ)
)
b ≤ ηk (2.9)
We simulate a panel of 100,000 firms to the stationary distribution. Then we study
the impulse responses of this economy to various shocks.
2.5.1 Calibration
We choose the following parameters independently of the model equilibrium. Discount
factor β is set to 0.96 to match annual interest rate 4%. Depreciation rate is set to
5%, as estimated by Nadiri and Prucha (1996). Curvature of the production function
α is set to 0.7, as in Hennessy and Whited (2006) and Cooper and Ejarque (2003).8
Productivity z is normalized to 1. Exogenous bankruptcy rate is set to a small positive
number0.01 to ensure the existence of a stationary equilibrium.
Next we move on to the set of parameters that we estimate using firm-level data
from COMPUSTAT. The most important task is to estimate the structure of corporate
liquidity shocks. To our knowledge, this has not been done in the literature. Current
liabilities are what a firm needs to pay within a relatively short period of time. Hence
we use the ratio of current liabilities over total asset as proxy for liquidity shocks of
the period. We estimate the mean and variance of liquidity shocks using cross-sectional
mean and variance of firm’s current liabilities over total asset ratio, respectively. The
assumption behind our estimation is that all firms are subject to the same process
governing the idiosyncratic liquidity shock.
In our model there are two types of borrowing constraints: standard borrowing
constraint and credit line limit. We estimate the former using the leverage ratio and
the latter using credit line over capital ratio as documented in Sufi (2009). A summary
of our calibration is presented in Table 2.1.
8 For a detailed discussion of choice of α in production functions without labor, see Covas and Haan
(2012).
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Before explaining the results of our quantitative exercise, it is useful to discuss how
well the model does in capturing some of the key moments in data. One way of checking
the validity of our estimates is to compare the cash over capital ratio of our model to
the data. In our calibrated model, cash over capital ratio is 0.32, while in the data it is
0.31.
Table 2.1: Calibration
Calibrated parameters Source
Discount factor β 0.96 Annual interest rate 4%
Depreciation rate δ 0.05 Nadiri and Prucha (1996)
Technology α 0.7 Cooper and Ejarque
(2003)
Productivity z 1 Normalization
Exogenous death rate θ 0.01 Guarantee existence of
stationary equilibrium
Estimated parameters Target moments Model Data
Mean of liquidity shocks µc 0.35 Cross-sectional mean of
current liabilities/asset
ratio
0.26 0.23
Variance of liquidity shocks σc 0.032 Cross-sectional vari-
ance of current liabili-
ties/asset ratio
0.018 0.02
Credit line constraint ξ 0.57 Mean of available credit
line/capital ratio
0.56 0.54
Standard borrowing constraint η 1.1 Mean of leverage ratio 0.73 0.61
Untargeted moment
Mean of cash/capital ra-
tio
0.32 0.31
2.5.2 Impulse Response
Key Result
Our key results are illustrated in Figure 2.8. The top row is for large firms (net worth
at top 25% of firms). Standard credit shocks (tightening of bond borrowing constraint)
are unable to generate a reduction in capital expenditure, or an increase in liquid assets
holdings for large firms, whereas credit line shocks are able to generate both.
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Figure 2.8: Capital Investment and Liquid Asset Holding under Different Shocks
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The intuition is as follows. Large firms have accumulated enough net worth so that
their borrowing constraints are no longer binding. Therefore, standard credit shocks
have no effects on their investment decision. However, credit line shocks do have an
effect on large firms by forcing them to hold more cash. Costly cash holdings increase
the effective marginal cost on capital investment. Therefore, firms optimally choose to
reduce investment.
For small firms (net worth at bottom 25% of firms), both standard credit shocks and
credit line shocks reduce their capital investment because these firms are both borrowing
constrained and liquidity constrained. But their implications on corporate cash holdings
are different. Standard credit shocks reduce corporate cash holdings because they reduce
corporate investment, whereas credit line shocks force firms to hold more cash per unit
of capital.
Finally, productivity shocks lead to a reduction in capital for both large and small
firms, consistent with the data. However, productivity shocks also imply a counter-
factual reduction in liquid assets holdings.
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Prediction of Loan-Bond Composition
Adrian, Colla and Shin (2013) documents that loan financing collapses whereas bond
financing remains strong. Our credit line shocks match that feature in the data, whereas
standard credit shocks and productivity shocks do not (Figure 2.9). As credit line shocks
hit, firms’ demand for liquid assets rises. This increases the demand for corporate bonds
despite a reduction in corporate investment.
Figure 2.9: Corporate Bond and Bank Loan under Different Shocks
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2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we document a significant reduction in capital investment, an increase in
liquid assets holdings, and an increase in relative amount of corporate bonds issuance
to bank loans issuance by self-financing firms during the Great Recession.
These three facts cannot be simultaneously accounted for in models with collateral
constraints or productivity shocks. To explain the three facts, we propose a model where
firms’ capital stock is subject to liquidity shocks. Bank credit lines and liquid assets are
substitutes for insuring against liquidity shocks and safeguarding capital investment.
Given the amount of credit lines available, firms have to bundle one unit of capital with
certain units of liquid assets to cover the remaining liquidity risk. When banks tighten
the credit lines, firms have to bundle extra units of liquid assets with each unit of capital
to cover the increased liquidity risk. Holding liquid assets, however, is costly because of
their low return. This increases the marginal cost of capital investment. Hence, firms
optimally reduce their capital investment.
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Then we calibrate our model to firm-level balance sheet information from COMPU-
STAT, and compare the predictions of negative productivity shocks in a standard RBC
model, tightening of the collateral constraints in a standard model of financial frictions,
and credit line shocks in our model. We find that standard credit shocks do not af-
fect self-financing firms, leaving their capital expenditure and cash holdings unchanged;
productivity shocks generate a decrease of capital expenditure across firm sizes. But
they imply a counter-factual reduction in firms’ liquid assets holdings; credit line shocks
generate a decrease in capital expenditure as well as an increase in liquid assets holdings
across firm sizes. Credit line shocks also generate a compositional change between loans
and bonds as in the data.
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Appendix A
Appendix
A.1 Employment Recovery Across Recessions
In this section, additional comparison of the speed of employment recovery is provided.
In Section 1.3, employment is measured as total hours of all persons in the non-farm
business sector. Total hours worked is detrended using an HP filter. In Figure 1.1 of
that section, we compare the recovery paths of total hours for recessions before and
after the mid-1980s. For clarity, only the average recovery paths for recessions before
and after the mid-1980s are displayed. In Figure A.1, we include the recovery paths for
all recessions. If a subsequent recession occurs before employment has fully recovered,
the recovery path is truncated.
Besides total hours, another commonly used measure for employment is total em-
ployment level in the non-farm business sector. Employment exhibits a similar pattern
to total hours. For the recessions prior to the mid-1980s, employment recovers to pre-
recession peaks within four years after the NBER recession end date. In contrast, for the
three recessions after the mid-1980s, employment is significantly below the pre-recession
peak even six years after NBER recession end date.
A.2 Average Labor Productivity and GDP
In this section, time series plots of HP filtered average labor productivity and GDP are
compared for the pre-1985 and the post-1985 periods. Labor productivity is calculated
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Figure A.1: Employment Recovery Comparison
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as real output per hour of all persons from the non-farm business sector. We apply an
HP filter and plot the residual.
Prior to the mid-1980s, the pattern of labor productivity tracks that of GDP closely
during business cycles. Labor productivity falls during recessions and recovers at ap-
proximately the same speed as GDP. This results in a procyclical pattern of labor
productivity.
After the mid-1980s, the correlation between GDP and labor productivity becomes
weaker. In a recession, labor productivity drops with GDP. However, during the recov-
ery, labor productivity recovers much faster than GDP, resulting in no correlation or
even a negative correlation between the two series.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof 5 The break-even condition of financial intermediaries is:
wSnS + wJnJ = (1− F (z∗))
(
wSnS + wJnJ
)
R+
∫ z∗
z
[
nSθS + nJθJ
]α
f(z)dz
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Figure A.2: Employment Recovery Comparison
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The right hand side of this condition can be simplified into:
(1− F (z∗))
(
wSnS + wJnJ
)
R+
∫ z∗
z
[
nSθS + nJθJ
]α
f(z)dz
=
∫
min
{
z
[
nSθS + nJθJ
]α
,
(
wSnS + wJnJ
)
R
}
f(z)dz
=
∫
z
[
nSθS + nJθJ
]α
f (z) dz −
∫
max
{
0, z
[
nSθS + nJθJ
]α − (wSnS + wJnJ)R} f(z)dz.
From this condition, we obtain:∫
max
{
0, z
[
nSθS + nJθJ
]α −R(wSnS + wJnJ)} f(z)dz
=
∫
z
[
nSθS + nJθJ
]α
f (z) dz −
(
wSnS + wJnJ
)
.
Plugging this into the Bellman’s equation of firms, we get:
V 1
(
nS
)
= max
nJ
{∫
z∗
[
z
[
nSθS + nJθJ
]α − (wSnS + wJnJ)R] f(z)dz
+β [1− (1− F (z∗)) (1− ξ)]V 1 (0) + β (1− F (z∗)) (1− ξ)V 1
(
nS
′)}
= max
nJ
{∫
z
[
nSθS + nJθJ
]α
f (z) dz −
(
wSnS + wJnJ
)
+β [1− (1− F (z∗)) (1− ξ)]V 1 (0) + β (1− F (z∗)) (1− ξ)V 1
(
nS
′)}
as desired.
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Figure A.3: Before 1985: Average Labor Productivity and GDP (HP-Filtered)
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A.4 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof 6 Assuming there is no risk of default or exogenous separation ξ = 0, constant
returns to scale α = 1, and that all junior workers transition to senior workers in one
period ζ = 1, we can analytically solve for the value function and wage rates using a
guess-and-verify approach:
V 1
(
nS
)
= E (z) (1− φ) (θS − θJ)nS
wS
(
nS , nJ
)
= E (z)
{
θS − [1− β (1− δ)] (1− φ) (θS − θJ)}
wJ
(
nS , nJ
)
= E (z)
[
θJ + β (1− δ) (1− φ) (θS − θJ)]
which implies: [
wS − wJ] = φ [E (z) θS − E (z) θJ] .
A.5 Recursive Stationary Equilibrium
Definition 3 A recursive stationary equilibrium consists of:
• Value functions:
– V 1
(
nS
)
and V 2
(
nS , nJ , wS , wJ , R, z∗
)
for firms
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Figure A.4: After 1985: Average Labor Productivity and GDP (HP-Filtered)
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– S1
(
nS
)
and S2
(
nS , nJ , wS , wJ , R, z∗
)
for senior workers
– J1
(
nS
)
and J2
(
nS , nJ , wS , wJ , R, z∗
)
for junior workers
• Policy function:
– nJ
(
nS
)
for firms
• Wage schedules:
– wS
(
nS , nJ
)
for senior workers
– wJ
(
nS , nJ
)
for junior workers
• Interest rate schedule and bankruptcy cutoff: R (nS , nJ) and z∗ (nS , nJ)
• A distribution of firm sizes: g (nS)
• Aggregates: consumption C, output Y , labor demand Ld, and labor supply Ls
such that:
• Given the schedules of wage rates, interest rate and bankruptcy cutoff, value func-
tion V 1
(
nS
)
and policy function nJ
(
nS
)
solve firm’s optimal hiring problem
• The schedules of wage rates, interest rates and bankruptcy cutoffs jointly satisfy
wage bargaining and break-even equations (1.1), (1.2), (1.3), and (1.4)
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• The distribution of firms g (nS) is consistent with the policy function of firms:
g
(
nS
′)
=

∫
nS
[
1− (1− ξ) (1− F (z∗ (nS , nJ (nS))))] g (nS) dnS if nS′ = 0∫
nS
 (1− ξ)
(
1− F (z∗ (nS , nJ (nS))))
×1
{
nS
′
= (1− δ) (nS + ζnJ)} g (nS) dnS
 if nS′ > 0
• Aggregate output is consistent with the distribution of firms:
Y =
∫
nS
E (z)
[
θSnS + θJnJ
(
nS
)]α
g
(
nS
)
dnS
• Labor demand is consistent with the distribution of firms:
Ld =
∫
nS
[
nS + nJ
(
nS
)]
g
(
nS
)
dnS
• Labor supply is consistent with household’s intra-period Euler equation:
uc (C,L
s) w¯ = uL (C,L
s)
where w¯ is the average wage rate in the economy defined by
w¯ ≡
∫
nS
[
wS
(
nS , nJ
(
nS
))
nS + wJ
(
nS , nJ
(
nS
))
nJ
(
nS
)]
g
(
nS
)
dnS
Ld
• Labor market clears:
Ld = Ls
• Goods market clears:
Y = C
A.6 Determining θS/θJ Using the CPS
As outlined in Section 1.6, we use data from the Displayed Workers, Occupational
Mobility and Job Tenure supplements of the CPS to infer the relative productivity of
senior to junior workers. This supplemental survey has not been administered every
year, and the survey questions have varied somewhat over time. The first time these
supplemental questions were asked was in 1973. Unfortunately, questions inquiring
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about displacement as well as prior and current wages were not asked again until 1984.
Since then, these questions have continued to be included bi-annually to present.
Following the method used in Topel (1991), we restrict attention to male respondents
between the ages of 20 and 60 whose jobs end exogenously. We then deflate nominal
wages by the GNP price deflator for consumption expenditure. For these workers we
calculate the average change in log weekly wages for the prior and current jobs.
The percentage drop in wages following an exogenous separation is affected by the
business cycle. Specifically, the survey conducted immediately following each recession
yields a larger drop in wages than the average drop experienced in surrounding observa-
tions. We therefore calculate the drop in wages by both including and excluding these
points. For the supplemental survey administered prior to the double-dip recession, we
find an average change in log weekly wages of −2.7%. For those surveys administered
after the double-dip recession, we find an average change in log weekly wages of −14.7%.
When the post-recession data points are excluded, we observe an average change in log
weekly wages of −11.5%.
A.7 Determining θS/θJ Using the PSID
Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and Altonji and Williams (2005) use the following specifi-
cation for estimating returns to seniority:
Wijt = β0t+ β1Xijt + β2Tijt + ijt (A.1)
where Wijt is the log earning of person i in job j in period t. X is total labor market
experience and T is tenure with the employer. The error term  is potentially dependent
on individual specific component µi and match specific component φij :
ijt = µi + φij
These individual specific and match specific components are likely to be correlated with
both tenure and earnings: an individual with higher ability or a good match between
worker and employer are likely to lead to both longer tenure and higher earnings.
To deal with this endogeneity problem, Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and Altonji and
Williams (2005) propose an instrumental variable DTij for tenure. This instrument is
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defined to be the deviation of tenure Tijt from the mean T¯ij of the sample observations
on job match ij. Effectively, incorporating this instrument is equivalent to demeaning
Equation (A.1) from its mean over time. Since individual and match specific components
in the error term are assumed to be invariant over time, they will be eliminated after this
demeaning procedure. Intuitively, although individual and match specific components
are likely to affect the earnings of a worker, they stay constant within a worker-job
match. Therefore, if we look within each worker-job match, the increase in earnings
over time cannot be attributed to those two components. A similar instrument is also
used for year.
Altonji and Williams (2005) extend the methodology of Altonji and Shakotko (1987)
to newer PSID waves of 1983 to 1991. We further extend their estimations to 2013. Be-
tween 1968 and 1997, PSID interviews were conducted annually. Since then, interviews
have been biennial. This change in the frequency of interviews does not affect the valid-
ity of the regression, because returns to tenure are estimated from earnings gains within
worker-job matches.
Summary statistics are included in Table A.1.
The results of our regression analysis are included in Table A.2. We report the
estimated returns to tenure at 3, 5, 10 as well as the mean tenure for workers.
A.8 Simulation Results with an Exogenous Firm Exit Shock
In Section 1.7, recessions are simulated as a one-time, unexpected variance shock that
disproportionately affects smaller firms. As a robustness check to this particular version
of the shock, we analyze a simpler version in which we exogenously force a fraction of
firms to exit with equal probability across all firm sizes. We calibrate the fraction of
firms which exit to match the percentage drop in output in the data. Figures A.5, A.6,
and A.7 display the results from this version of the shock. The resulting business cycle
patterns are virtually unaffected compared to our benchmark model found in Section
1.7.3.
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Table A.1: Summary Statistics, PSID
Variable Panel 1: 1975-1982 Panel 2: 1983-2013
ln(Earnings) 2.827 2.883
(0.458) (0.573)
Experience 16.540 16.850
(10.820) (9.710)
Tenure 8.795 7.952
(9.083) (7.934)
Education 12.811 13.540
(2.430) (2.123)
Married Now 0.876 0.815
(0.330) (0.389)
Union 0.302 0.161
(0.473) (0.367)
Disability Affecting Work 0.063 0.073
(0.244) (0.261)
Age 36.115 37.018
(11.240) (9.973)
North Central Region 0.344 0.327
North Eastern Region 0.224 0.358
Southern Region 0.271 0.279
Western Region 0.160 0.182
Observations 6882 23125
A.9 First Moment TFP Shock
In this section, we demonstrate how a one-period unexpected shock to the mean of
TFP would affect our model economy. Since the shock is unexpected, employment is
not affected until the first period following the shock. In the period the shock is applied
(period 0), the effects of our mechanism are small relative to the shock to TFP. In our
benchmark model, we calibrated the magnitude of the shock to match the observed drop
in output. If we do the same with the first moment TFP shock, there is insufficient
disruption to firms, employment is virtually unaffected, and recovery is immediate.
Instead, we calibrate the TFP shock to cause the implied drop in employment for the
first period following the shock to match the data.
The results of this shock are displayed in Figure A.8. Matching the drop in employ-
ment requires an unreasonably large shock to the mean of TFP causing the observed
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Table A.2: IV Estimation of Returns to Tenure
Panel 1: 1975-1982 Panel 2: 1983-2013
3 Years of Tenure 0.0444 0.0778
(0.0169) (0.0106)
5 Years of Tenure 0.0548 0.1143
(0.0235) (0.0143)
10 Years of Tenure 0.0422 0.1286
(0.0353) (0.0188)
Mean Tenure 0.0484 0.1302
(0.0324) (0.0173)
Figure A.5: Transition Path Comparison of Models
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drop in output at the time of the shock to drop much too far relative to the data (left
panel). As employment is still at the steady state level this also implies a large drop to
average labor productivity (right panel). However, the ensuing recovery is very similar
to our benchmark model. Figure A.9 displays the recovery with the initial period re-
moved. When compared with our benchmark model (Figure 1.14), it is observed that
these patterns are quite similar.
As has been outlined in recent literature, an complete characterization of business
cycles includes more than a shock to the first moment of TFP. Bloom et al. (2014)
and Stock and Watson (2012) suggest that second moment rather than first moment
shocks to TFP may be chiefly responsible for driving business cycle dynamics. Salgado
et al. (2016) suggests that skewness in sales growth shifts significantly negative during
recessions. Through the lens of our model, both increases in variance and leftward shifts
in skewness would cause much larger amounts of exit and distortion to employment than
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Figure A.6: 1973 Recession: Output, Hours Worked and Labor Productivity
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Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Authors’ calculations
Figure A.7: 2008 Recession: Output, Hours Worked and Labor Productivity
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a shift solely to the first moment in TFP. Even still, a one-period unexpected shock to
the average of TFP does generate a slower recovery and reduces the cyclicality of labor
productivity.
A.10 Simulation Results for Other Recessions
In Section 1.7, we compare the simulation results of our model with the data for the
1973 recession and the 2008 recession. In this section, additional comparisons for the
recessions of 1982, 1990, and 2001 are presented.
The three recessions prior to the mid-1980s include the 1973 recession, the 1980
recession, and the 1982 recession. The results for the 1973 recession are presented in
Section 1.7. The 1980 recession is immediately followed by the 1982 recession so the
recovery path is not complete. Below is the comparison of output, unemployment, and
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Figure A.8: Transition Path Comparison of Models
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Figure A.9: Transition Path Comparison of Models
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labor productivity between data and model for the 1982 recession:
The three recessions after the mid-1980s are the 1990 recession, the 2001 recession,
and the 2008 recession. The results for the 2008 recession are presented in Section 1.7.
The 1990 and 2001 recessions are plotted below:
A.11 Compare Model and Data Using Employment Level
In Section 1.7, we compare the path of employment recovery between our model and
the data. Employment is measured as the percentage deviation of total hours in non-
farm business sector from its trend. Another popular measure of employment is the
employment level. As a robustness check, we now compare the path of employment
recovery in our model with the employment population ratio.
To remove the trend in employment level, we apply an HP filter. Figure A.13
compares the employment recovery between our model and data, using two different
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Figure A.10: 1982 Recession
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Figure A.11: 1990 Recession
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measures of employment. Figure A.14 is the comparison for the 2008 recession.
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Figure A.12: 2001 Recession
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Figure A.13: 1973 Recession
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Figure A.14: 2008 Recession
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